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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is struggling to emerge from an era of loose 
mortgage underwriting standards—lapses in credit analysis that led to 
origination and securitization of toxic loans.1  The fallout has been 
crippling, costing borrowers their homes,2 investors their money,3 and 
the government its taxes.4  
                                                          
 
 1. In 2006 alone, nearly 3 million subprime loans were originated and funded 
with an aggregate of over  $1 trillion.  State of the U.S. Economy and Implications for the 
Federal Budget:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 10 (2007); see 
also Yulia Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 32 
(Dec. 5, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396. 
 2. From July 2007 to August 2009, 1.8 million homes were lost to foreclosure 
and 502 million more residential foreclosures were begun.  See CONGRESSIONAL 
OVERSIGHT PANEL, MAY OVERSIGHT REPORT, REVIVING LENDING TO SMALL BUSINESSES 
AND FAMILIES AND THE IMPACT OF THE TALF 1-3 (2009).  Nationally, between 10% and 
13% of mortgage borrowers have defaulted and face foreclosure, according to the 
Lender Processing Services figures, as reported at PR Newswire, LPS September ‘First 
Look’ Mortgage Report:  August Month-End Data Shows More Delinquent Loans Entering 
Foreclosure Process, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2010, 6:47 PM), 
 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUS224331+15-Sep-2010+PRN20100915. Another 
article reporting these figures calculates that this rate indicates more than 7.2 million 
mortgage loans are behind on their payments.  Carrie Bay, Residential Mortgage 
Delinquency Rate Surpasses 10%:  LPS, DSNEWS.COM (Feb. 4, 2010), 
 http://www.dsnews.com/articles/mortgage-delinquency-rate-surpasses-10-lps-2010-
02-04.  The foreclosure rate is ten times pre-crisis levels, and the aggregate number 
of foreclosure sales in one month (around 100,000 nationwide) is now similar to the 
number of pre-crisis foreclosure sales for an entire year.  Alex Viega, Foreclosure Rate:  
Americans on Pace for 1 Million Foreclosures in 2010, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 15, 2010, 
5:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/15/foreclosure-rate- 
American_n_647130.html. 
 3. MAUREEN F. MAITLAND & DAVID BLITZER, S&P/CASE-SHILLER HOME PRICE 
INDICES 2009, A YEAR IN REVIEW 3 (2010), available at http://www.anderson-real-
estate.com/PDFs/spcs/SPCaseShillerYearinReview_Jan2010.pdf (real estate prices 
tumbled after 2005, reaching a record low in real estate price decline at -19% 
through the first quarter of 2009). 
The Dow Jones industrial average tumbled 7 percent, or 777.68 points, 
eclipsing the record point drop after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, to 
close at 10,365.45. The technology-heavy Nasdaq composite index slid 9.14 
percent, or 199.61, to 1983.73, and the broader Standard & Poor’s 500-stock 
index lost 8.79 percent, or 106.62, to close at 1106.39.   
Heather Landy & Renae Merle, A Record Fall on Wall Street:  Stocks Dive as Bailout Bill 
Fails to Pass, THE WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/29/AR2008092900271.html?sid=ST2008092903526; 
see also ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION:  HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 29-38, 87-113 (2008) (attributing the 
financial crisis to un-tempered increases in home prices); Ruth Mantell, Home Prices 
Off Record 18% in Past Year, Case-Schiller Says, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 30, 2008, 11:49 
AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/home-prices-off-record-18-in-past-year-
case-shiller-says.   
 4. The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, provided for 
various types of economic stimuli, including tax rebates, intended to boost the U.S. 
economy, with a total taxpayer cost of an estimated $152 billion.  See CONGRESSIONAL 
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The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(the Dodd-Frank Act), passed last summer, was the first 
comprehensive effort to address the problems in the system that 
led—in sequence—to the subprime crisis, the housing crisis, and the 
financial crisis.5  This Act, which contains over 2,300 pages of 
legislation, is very broad as well as very detailed—even though 
hundreds of rulemakings have yet to completely define its 
parameters.6  But this extensive legislation deliberately did not deal 
with the biggest elephant (or perhaps elephants) in the room:  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  These government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs), behemoths of the secondary mortgage market, 
are currently in conservatorship and have (so far) cost taxpayers over 
$130 billion.7  Yet, our current residential mortgage market is utterly 
                                                          
BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE:  H.R. 5140 ECONOMIC STIMULUS ACT OF 2008 3–5 
(2008).  The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 which created the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) permitted government purchase of “toxic” 
assets from financial institutions.  When passed in 2008, TARP was anticipated to cost 
taxpayers $356 billion, but more recent estimates put its cost at $89 billion.  US 
Bailout Cost Seen Lower at $89 billion, REUTERS (Apr. 11, 2010), http:// 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/12/us-financial-bailout-
idUSTRE63B05N20100412.  The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(“Stimulus Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, mandated government appropriations to be 
used in job creation, investment promotion and stimulation of consumer spending, 
reflecting the Keynesian concept that a government should spend to pull a country 
out of recession.  See John Maynard Keynes, The Maintenance of Prosperity is Extremely 
Difficult, in NEW DEAL THOUGHT 403, 403-06 (Howard Zinn ed., 1966) (explaining 
that economic recovery could not continue without relying on government 
investment).  See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1935). 
 5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (to be codified at 12 
U.S.C. § 5518).   The 2,300-page text of the Dodd-Frank Act is available at 
http://banking.senate.gov/public/ and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi- 
bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.4173.  The law has been called the most sweeping financial 
reform legislation since the Great Depression.  See, e.g., Damian Paletta and Aaron 
Lucchetti, Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape:  Senate Passes Overhaul That Will 
Touch Most Americans; Bankers Gird for Fight Over Fine Print, THE WALL ST. J. (July 16, 
2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704682604575369030061839958.h
tml.   
 6. Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1376 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5518); see also 
DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM 




 7. Bloomberg BusinessWeek speculated that, “[t]he cost of fixing Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, the mortgage companies that last year bought or guaranteed three-
quarters of all U.S. home loans, will be at least $160 billion and could grow to as 
much as $1 trillion after the biggest bailout in American history.  Fannie and 
Freddie, now 80 percent owned by U.S. taxpayers, already have drawn $145 billion 
from an unlimited line of government credit granted to ensure that home buyers can 
get loans while the private housing-finance industry is moribund. That surpasses the 
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dependent upon them for credit and liquidity.8  With political 
pressures to stop taxpayer bailouts9 and the reality of a frozen 
mortgage market should Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cease to 
exist,10 when it comes to the GSEs, the administration may be damned 
if it does and damned if it doesn’t. 
For decades, the U.S. mortgage finance system was the envy of the 
world—the only industrialized nation to have a significant segment of 
housing costs covered by private capital through a securitization 
investment system.11  The United States is the only country to 
                                                          
amount spent on rescues of American International Group Inc., General Motors Co. 
or Citigroup Inc., which have begun repaying their debts.” Lorraine Woellert & John 
Gittelsohn, Fannie-Freddie Fix at $160 Billion with $1 Trillion Worst Case, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 14, 2010, 3:00 AM) http://www.businessweek.com/ news/2010-
06-14/fannie-freddie-fix-at-160-billion-with-1-trillion-worst-case.html.  Other figures 
put the bailout cost at $135 thus far and costing a total of $156 billion.  Binyamin 
Applebaum, Fannie and Freddie May Need Infusion, THE N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010; 
Zachary Goldfarb, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Bailout Cost is Likely to Rise to $154 Billion, 
Agency Projects, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2010. 
 8. See infra notes 164-165and accompanying text.  
 9. See, e.g., Dwight Jaffee, Private Markets Offer More Choices, THE N.Y. TIMES 
(March 8, 2011, 11:17 AM), 
http://nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/07/should-fannie-and-freddie-be-
dissolved-private-mortgage-market-offers-more-choices (opining that winding down 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “will provide significant benefits for housing and 
markets while saving taxpayers the costs of future bailouts”).   
 10. See, e.g., Congress Warned to Tread Cautiously with Repair of Housing Office, 
NATION’S BUILDING NEWS ONLINE (April 4, 2011) [hereinafter NAHB April 
Statement], http://www.nbnnews.com/NBN/issues/2011-04-04/Front+Page/3.html 
(arguing that “it is critical that any reforms be well-conceived, orderly and phased in 
over time” and pointing out that a “piecemeal approach to reform” would “disrupt 
the housing market and could push the nation back into a deep recession”).  The 
NAHB pleads with Congress to avoid making “damaging, ill-advised changes to the 
housing finance system at such a critical time.”  Id.  Other associations have likewise 
urged a continuing and predictable government role in housing finance and, at the 
very least, a reasonable transition period to a less-taxpayer-supported system.  Jann 
Swanson, Non-Agency Lending:  How to Attract Private Funding to a Riskier Market, MND 
NEWSWIRE (Feb. 16, 2011, 2:31 PM), 
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/02162011_housing_finance_reform.asp.  These 
include the American Bankers Association, American Financial Services Association, 
CRE Finance Council, Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable, 
the Mortgage Bankers Association, the National Multi Housing Council and the Real 
Estate Roundtable.  Id.  David Stevens, who recently stepped down as Assistant 
Secretary of the Federal Housing Administration, agrees that too-rapid government 
withdrawal from the housing market will have a severe adverse market effect.  Id.  
Timothy Geithner echoes this statement.  Zachary Goldfarb & Dina ElBoghdady, 
Geither Warns of Mortgage System Risks, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2011, at A11. 
 11. Touting the rising homeownership rate and the role of Fannie and Freddie, 
Leland Brendsel told Congress that “America enjoys the world’s best housing-finance 
system . . . .  In fact, our nation’s mortgage-finance system works so well that most 
Americans take for granted a reliable supply of low-cost mortgage credit in 
communities across the nation every day.”  H.R. 3703—The Housing Finance Regulatory 
Improvement Act—Part I:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm on Banking and Financial Services, 106th 
Cong. 267 (2000) (statement of Leland C. Brendsel, Chairman and C.E.O., Freddie 
Mac).  The unique characteristics of the U.S. real estate finance market attracted 
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routinely offer homebuyers thirty-year fixed-rate prepayable 
mortgage loans.12  Better capital accessibility has made 
homeownership opportunities available to more Americans.13  The 
GSEs have performed a vital role in financing the production of 
rental housing as well.14  Our real estate capital markets set the gold 
standard worldwide for what is possible in freeing trapped asset 
values and increasing the wealth of borrowers and investors alike. 
                                                          
foreign investment.  Id.  In addition, “many foreign markets copied the United States 
model by creating similar debt instruments based on their housing markets.”  
Randolph C. Thompson, Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a 
Global Financial Crisis, 5 AM. U. BUS. L. BRIEF 51, 52-53 (Fall 2008); see also Pelma 
Jacinth Rajapakse, Issuance of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities in Australia—Legal 
and Regulatory Aspects, 29 U.N.S.W.L.J. 173, 173–76 (2006) (describing similar 
securities in Australia).  Recent studies of different mortgage finance systems have 
suggested that perhaps the United States would not suffer by conforming to 
European or Canadian housing finance models.  Canada, for example, typically has 
five to ten-year terms loans that either have adjustable interest rates or are fixed rate 
loans that impose a prepayment penalty.  Denmark’s mortgage financing system in 
particular has earned recent attention as a potential model for the United States in 
the absence of a GSE-supported secondary market and mortgage backed securities. 
Anthony Sanders & Michael Lea, Do We Need the 30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage? 
(Mercatus Ctr., Working Paper No. 11-15, March 2011); Michael Lea, International 
Comparison of Mortgage Product Offerings, RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM. (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/74023_10122_Research
_RIHA_Lea_Report.pdf; Arnold Kling, 20 Percent Down, for Starters, THE N.Y. TIMES 
(March 8, 2011, 4:04 PM), 
 http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/07/should-fannie-and-freddie-
be-disssolved/what-to-do-right-now-about-housing; see also Jaffe, supra note 9; 
Christopher Mayer, Mortgage Examples from Abroad, THE N.Y. TIMES (March 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/03/07/should-fannie-and-freddie-
be-disssolved/mortgage-examples-from-abroad (discussing Denmark’s mortgage 
finance system).  
 12. Sanders & Lea, supra note 11; Binyamin Applebaum, Without Loan Giants, 30-
Year Mortgage May Fade Away, THE N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/business/04housing.html; Donna Borak, Are 
30-Year Fixed’s Days Numbered? AM. BANKER, March 29, 2011, available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-252576360.html.  But see Lea, supra note 11; 
Mayer, supra note 11 (pointing out that Denmark offers thirty-year fixed rate 
mortgage loans even though originators in Denmark retain the credit risks of such 
loans).  The Economist points out, however, that “[i]n truth, however, there is no 
magic system.  The Danish mortgage banks are clearly too big to fail, so the problem 
of an implicit government guarantee for banks remains.  The same is true for 
Canada.”  A Special Report on Property:  Bricks and Slaughter, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 3, 
2011) [hereinafter Economist Special Report], 
 http://www.economist.com/node/L8250385. 
 13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES: 
  HOMEOWNERSHIP, HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS STATISTICS DIVISION (2004), 
available at 
 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html; see also 
ROBIN MALLOY & JAMES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:  PROBLEMS, CASES AND 
MATERIALS 314–15 (3d ed. 2007) (showing increase in homeownership rates among 
black, Asian & Pacific Islander and Hispanic populations increasing at greater than 
average rates from 1994-2004).  
 14. See infra notes  74-84 and accompanying text. 
BOYACK.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  8:33 PM 
1494 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1489 
Over the past decade, this system undoubtedly became unhinged—
and it is now critical to reform its failings.  But a complete wind-down 
of the GSEs, which are the linchpin of our housing finance system, 
goes too far.  Subtracting Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the 
finance equation may very well be market suicide, and the 
repercussions for borrowers, communities, and investors would be 
dire indeed.  Furthermore, this extreme step is unnecessary:  the 
system’s failures can be adequately (and better) addressed within the 
GSE framework.  
Undoubtedly there is still ample dirty “bathwater” to throw out as 
we reform the mortgage finance market system.  But it would be an 
excruciating mistake to bow to political pressures and throw out the 
“baby” too.15  Current and future mortgage borrowers will only be 
adequately “protected” if they are empowered through access to 
capital, appropriately constrained by valid underwriting criteria.  A 
well functioning market—rather than political scapegoating—is the 
best way to emerge from the recession and protect future buyers and 
investors alike.   
This article first discusses the history and purposes of the GSEs and 
what went wrong with the system that led to the 2008 conservatorship 
and bailout.  With reference to the Obama Administration’s February 
2011 Report to Congress, “Reforming America’s Housing Finance 
Market,”16  Part II analyzes proposals to reform and wind down the 
GSEs in light of their likely legal and market impact.  Part III offers 
some general suggestions on better approaches to crafting America’s 
future mortgage market and advocates for solutions more precisely 
tailored to remedy apparent systemic problems while achieving the 
identified policy goals. 
                                                          
 15. A week after the author used this metaphor at the Law Review Symposium on 
March 3, 2011, the March 2011 edition of SoutheastREBusiness.com coincidentally 
quoted Willy Walker, head of Walker & Dunlop, using the same metaphor to 
describe the same problem.  Coleman Wood, The Future of Fannie/Freddie?, SE. REAL 
ESTATE BUS., Mar. 2011, available at 
 http://www.southeastrebusiness.com/articles/MAR11/cover2.html   (“Before they 
go and dismantle these things [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac], they really need to 
make sure they’re not throwing the baby out with the bathwater, because what I read 
in that white paper is that they’re contemplating doing just that.”)   
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REFORMING 
AMERICA’S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET:  A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2011) [hereinafter 
Treasury/HUD Report], available at  
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Reforming%20America’s%20Housi
ng%20Finance%20Market.pdf.  
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I. WHY THEY EXIST AND WHAT WENT WRONG 
A. The History and Purposes of the GSEs 
America’s current residential mortgage market was born in the 
ashes of the Great Depression through the National Housing Act of 
1934.17  As part of an effort to promote residential mortgage lending 
and homeownership, the Act established the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae).18  By 1970, Fannie Mae, together with its 
“sister” entity, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation 
(Freddie Mac), became privately funded, government sponsored 
enterprises, or GSEs, chartered by Congress and regulated by federal 
agencies, but owned by private shareholders.19  Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were charged with the mandate of promoting quality 
housing options by:  (a) purchasing qualifying residential loans from 
mortgage originators to increase home finance market liquidity, and 
(b) providing capital support to multifamily housing projects.  In 
fulfilling their mandate, these GSEs created a secondary mortgage 
market:  a market for buyers of funded mortgages.  The existence of a 
robust secondary market for mortgages markedly changed the nature 
of the U.S. residential mortgage system and increased market 
liquidity and capital available for home financing. 
Mortgage originators set up and fund loans to homeowners in what 
is called the primary mortgage market.20  The secondary market for 
mortgages encourages the flow of mortgage capital directly by 
                                                          
 17. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–479, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 et seq.). 
 18. Id. § 1. 
 19. Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–351, §§ 303(a), 
303(e), 304(a), 84 Stat. 450, 452–54 (1970).  For details on the structure and 
purposes of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see Richard Green, Robert Van Order on 
Fannie and Freddie, RICHARD’S REAL ESTATE AND URBAN ECONOMICS BLOG (July 31, 
2008, 10:59 AM), http://real-estate-and-urban.blogspot.com/2008/07/robert-van-
order-on-fannie-and-freddie.html.  Previously, in 1968, Fannie Mae had been split 
into a “private” corporation (Fannie Mae) and a publicly-financed institution with 
explicit government guaranty of repayment of securities (Government National 
Mortgage Association or Ginnie Mae).  GINNIEMAE.COM, 
http://www.ginniemae.gov/media/ginnieFAQ.asp?Section=Media (last visited May 
14, 2011).   Ginnie Mae bought and securitized mortgages which were made to 
government employees or veterans (such mortgages also being guaranteed by the 
government).  In addition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, there are twelve Federal 
Home Loan Banks (the FHLBs, sometimes called the “mini-GSEs”).  These banks 
perform similar functions as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (providing funds to 
originating lending institutions).  While not explicitly discussed in this article, many 
of the principles applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also apply to the FHLBs.  
 20. Robert Van Order, The U.S. Mortgage Market:  A Model of Dueling Charters, 11 J. 
HOUS. RESEARCH 233, 233 (2000). 
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replenishing the lending funds of mortgage originators almost 
immediately rather than over thirty years of repayments.21  A 
secondary market for mortgages also indirectly encourages increased 
real estate capital by (a) matching up the cost of lending capital to 
loan returns and (b) spreading risks borne by a mortgage lender.22  
Prior to the creation of the GSEs, most home lenders obtained 
capital to lend from deposits in savings accounts.23  The availability of 
such funds is highly market sensitive, as investors will allocate their 
investment capital according to competitive market options.24  While 
attracting funds requires a flexible interest rate structure, most 
mortgages in the United States are thirty-year fixed rate prepayable 
mortgages.  Selling funded mortgages, however, permits a lender to 
immediately recoup its capital, and solves the “time horizon 
imbalance” created by pairing a fixed rate mortgage with a market-
sensitive savings rate structure.25  Not only does this structure move 
more capital into mortgages, it encourages fixed rate loans to be 
made by taking the interest rate risk away from the originating banks. 
In addition, the community-bank-based lending model in the 
United States suffered from geographic limitations.  Capital 
availability was dependent on wealth and savings in a particular 
community, creating great regional disparity with respect to the 
availability of mortgage capital.26  The vast size of the United States 
and the extreme diversity of its communities and populations proved 
                                                          
 21. Richard Green, Robert Van Order on Fannie and Freddie, RICHARD’S REAL ESTATE 
AND URBAN ECONOMICS BLOG (July 31, 2008, 10:59 AM), http://real-estate-and-
urban.blogspot.com/2008/07/robert-van-order-on-fannie-and-freddie.html; see also 
Van Order, supra note 20, at 233-239 (2000); FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO MODIGLIANI, 
MORTGAGE AND MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS 19–20 (1992) (discussing the 
congressional intent for establishing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 22. About Fannie Mae, FANNIEMAE.COM, 
 http://www.fanniemae.com/kb/index?page=home&c=aboutus (last visited Apr. 12, 
2011). 
 23. Before the Savings & Loan crisis in 1980, local thrifts (saving/lending 
institutions) dominated residential home finance in the United States.  During the 
decades prior to 1980, deposits by local residents into savings accounts formed the 
source of primary mortgage capital.  Because of the narrow geographic focus of these 
home lenders, funding decisions were made in the context of the applicable locality.  
For a concise description of how the primary mortgage market dominated home 
lending prior to the 1970s and securitization, see Thompson supra note 11, at 51-52. 
 24. See MALLOY & SMITH supra note 13, at 380. 
 25. Id. at 380-82. 
 26. The 2009 Economic Landscape, The Sand States:  Anatomy of a Perfect Housing-
Market Storm, in FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE:  FOURTH QUARTER 2008, THE 
ECONOMIC LANDSCAPE:  HOW THE RECESSION IS UNFOLDING ACROSS FOUR U.S. REGIONS, 
30–31 (2009), available at  
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2009_vol3_1/AnatomyPerfectHousi
ng.html. 
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a stumbling block to equal access of housing finance capital.27  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac transformed mortgage lending from a local to 
a national industry, allowing wealth from one area of the country to 
be efficiently allocated to housing support in another region.28  This 
helped improve capital access for poorer regions as well as poorer 
neighborhoods, which is one reason that homeownership increased 
most rapidly over the past few decades in minority population groups.  
In addition, having a diverse geographic spread of mortgages within 
an investment pool helped spread the risk of default, since real estate 
prices, employment rates and other factors most relevant to 
likelihood of default are usually quite localized.29 
The secondary mortgage market creates a structure whereby all 
lender risks can be spread.  Mortgage lenders of long-term, fixed-rate, 
prepayable loans face several types of risk.  First, there is the risk 
inherent in all lending transactions that the borrower will default.  
The credit risk in mortgage loans—like all secured loans—is 
mitigated by the existence of valuable collateral.  The borrower’s 
credit is backed up by the lien on real property securing the payment 
obligation of the loan.  The fixed interest rate structure of a 
mortgage creates another risk—the risk that interest rates will 
increase and the borrower will stay locked in to a below-market loan.  
In the late 1970s when interest rates rose precipitously because of 
inflation sparked by the Arab oil embargo coupled with the birth of 
                                                          
 27. See id. (explaining the combination of factors that led to housing 
 imbalances). 
 28. See Van Order, supra note 20, at 237 (elaborating on Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac’s influence on the secondary market). 
 29. This is apparent in the localized nature of even the current international 
financial crisis.  Shayna M. Olesiuk & Kathy R. Kalser, The 2009 Economic Landscape, 
The Sand States:  Anatomy of a Perfect Housing-Market Storm, 3 FDIC QUARTERLY 30,  
31–32 (2009), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2009_vol3_1/vol3_1_sand_states.pd
f; see also Anthony Sanders, The Subprime Crisis and Its Role in the Financial Crisis,  
17 J. HOUS. ECON. 254, 258 (2008) (“California, Arizona and Nevada provide an 
excellent laboratory to examine the issue of housing price declines and increasing 
mortgage defaults.  These states had the largest increase in housing prices during the 
2000-2005 period.  In addition, given the rapid deterioration in housing affordability, 
these states experienced a fundamental change away from the traditional full asset 
and income documentation, fixed-rate mortgage to low-documentation adjustable-
rate mortgages.”); Dina ElBoghdady, Foreclosure Activity Rises in Most Metropolitan 
Areas, THE WASH. POST (July 30, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906271.html (“The 20 regions with 
the worst foreclosure rates were in the four states—Florida, California, Nevada and 
Arizona.”).  Properties concentrated in a mere thirty-five counties accounted for half 
of the country’s foreclosure actions and eight counties in Arizona, California, Florida 
and Nevada were the source of a quarter of the nation’s foreclosures in 2008).  Brad 
Heath, Most Foreclosures Pack into Few Counties, USA TODAY (Mar. 6, 2009, 7:13 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2009-03-05-
foreclosure_N.htm.   
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new investment vehicles such as mutual funds, banks were imperiled 
because they underestimated this very risk.30  While a renewed focus 
on “due on sale” clauses in mortgage loan agreements offered a 
limited way for lenders to mitigate this risk—by allowing lenders to 
“reset” the interest rate when a home was sold31—there was no vehicle 
in a standard thirty-year fixed rate loan to “call” prepayment or to 
increase the interest rate.32  
The ability of a mortgage borrower to prepay the mortgage loan 
creates a problem for lenders should the interest rate decrease rather 
than increase.  A non-prepayable fixed-rate loan merely allocates 
interest rate risk and interest rate upside to the lender.  If the interest 
rate increases, the lender loses money, but if the interest rate 
decreases, the lender gains the benefit of an above-market return.  
Not so with prepayable loans.  Falling interest rates motivate a 
borrower to refinance and repay the loan, resetting at the lower rate, 
which not only spells the lender’s loss of the valuable upside of 
interest rate fluctuations, but risks a lower total return on investment 
should the loan be repaid prior to its maturity.  The difference in 
total return on investment for a lender can be significant:  a borrower 
paying off a thirty-year mortgage after fifteen years can reduce its 
total interest payment to the lender by about a third.33  Both the 
interest rate risk and prepayment risk inherent in the thirty-year fixed 
rate prepayable loan structure can be, and typically is, allocated to a 
secondary mortgage purchaser.34  All these categories of risk—credit 
risk, interest rate risk and prepayment risk—are greater for longer-
term loans, and the standard mortgage loan term in the United 
States is thirty years.  A lender can avoid this temporal risk factor by a 
secondary market mortgage sale as well.35   
                                                          
 30. See Thompson supra note 11, at 51-52. 
 31. The Garn–St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–
320, § 413, 96 Stat. 1469, 1451–52 (1982) (clarifying that due-on-sale clauses in 
residential mortgages are enforceable).  Lenders did not widely employ these sorts of 
clauses prior to the late 1970s.  Id. 
 32. This is one reason for the failure of traditional savings and loan institutions.  
See Thompson, supra note 11, at 51-52 (outlining the events leading up to the 
financial crisis). 
 33. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13, at 393 (using a $200,000 loan at a 7% 
fixed interest rate as an example and calculating that a borrower will pay $279,018 in 
interest over thirty years in addition to the loan principal, but only $123,579 in 
interest over a fifteen-year term).  
 34. See generally ANDREW DAVIDSON, ET AL., SECURITIZATION:  STRUCTURING AND 
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS (2003).  The lender pays the secondary market purchaser for 
taking on this risk by selling mortgages at a discount from the face value of the loan.  
MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13, at 382.  The cost of selling the mortgage at a 
discount on the secondary market is typically passed on to the borrower through 
collection of an upfront fee.  Id. at 382-83.   
 35. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13, at 380. 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the first—and still by far the 
biggest—purchasers of mortgages on the secondary market.  The 
GSEs purchase mortgages from originating lenders, taking on most 
credit risks as well as interest rate, prepayment, and related temporal 
risks.  This risk shifting, along with direct replenishing of lending 
capital, vastly increased the number of loans that mortgage 
originators were both willing and able to make.36  Increased capital 
availability for home financing decreased the cost of homeownership 
and increased mortgage access.37  The FHA worked with Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac to provide insurance for lower income homebuyers, 
filling in gaps in capital availability that the market left open.38  The 
GSEs greased the wheels of finance to help middle-income Americans 
buy homes,39 and the FHA offered government insurance on loans to 
lower-income Americans so that homeownership was an option for 
them as well.40   
Together, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHA (along with 
certain other specialized government programs) played an enormous 
role in promoting home ownership and in subsidizing the cost of 
capital for would-be mortgage borrowers.  In response to these 
developments in the residential mortgage market, homeownership in 
this country increased from less than 40% to more than 60% in a few 
short years.41  Not only did homeownership increase, but access to 
mortgage capital through federally sponsored entities began to make 
homeownership a realizable dream for previously underserved 
minority populations across the country.42 
                                                          
 36. Id. at 380.  See generally DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 34. 
 37. Thompson, supra note 11, at 55.  
 38. Dan Immergluck, From Minor to Major Player:  The Geography of FHA Lending 
During the U.S. Mortgage Crisis, 33 JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, 1 (2011).  
 39. From the beginning, GSE-purchased loans had a size limit, intended to focus 
the entities’ repurchasing capital toward middle-income homebuyers.  
 40. See The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN 
DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov:80/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahisto
ry; see also Albert Monroe, How the Federal Housing Administration Affects Homeownership, 
HARV. U. DEP’T OF ECONS. (2001), http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/ 
governmentprograms/monroe_w02-4.pdf. 
 41. In 1940, 40% of Americans owned their home; by 2000, homeownership hit a 
record level of 66%, rising to over 69% by 2005.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL 
CENSUS OF HOUSING TABLES:  HOMEOWNERSHIP, HOUSING AND HOUSEHOLD ECONOMICS 
STATISTICS DIVISION (2004), available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/owner.html.  
and http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr308/q308tab5.html   
A significant portion of homeownership increase is also due to the GI bill and 
veterans administration loans, offered to soldiers returning from World War II and, 
later, Korea and Vietnam.   
 42. Homeownership has often been called “The American Dream” by  
politicians and lawmakers alike.  See Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16 at 1;  
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To fulfill their mission of increasing homeownership opportunity 
by growing market liquidity, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased, 
and continue to purchase, qualifying residential loans from mortgage 
originators.43  The GSEs will only purchase mortgages that meet 
certain standards; theoretically, loans purchased by the GSEs could 
not be too big or too risky.44  The specific requirements for GSE 
purchase have fluctuated over time.   
For example, qualifying loans can represent no more than a set 
percentage of asset value (defined as the purchase price).45  
Historically, the loan-to-value ratio for conforming mortgages was set 
at 20% (although 10% ratios were permitted with the enhanced 
                                                          
William J. Clinton, Remarks on The National Homeownership Strategy (June 5, 
1995) (“Expanding homeownership will strengthen our nation’s families and 
communities, strengthen our economy, and expand this country’s great middle class. 
Rekindling the dream of homeownership for America’s working families can prepare 
our nation to embrace the rich possibilities of the twenty-first century.”).  There is a 
wealth of scholarly literature expositing the many positive social externalities that a 
high homeownership rate creates, from better maintained communities and higher 
participation to promoting savings in the form of equity.  See, e.g., JB McCombs, 
Refining the Itemized Deduction for Home Property Tax Payments, 44 VAND. L. REV. 317, 
325-26 (1991); Sustainable Homeownership, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 26, 2010), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/02/sustainable_homeownership
_event.html; see also infra notes 59 and 68.  See generally RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND 
FREEDOM,  xiii (1999) (pointing out that the repressive regimes of Communist Russia 
and Nazi Germany were only possible because private property had been 
undermined.  “While property in some form is possible without liberty, the contrary 
is inconceivable.”). 
 43. See FABOZZI & MODIGLIANI, supra note 21.  For discussion of how loan 
qualification standards are created by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight (OFHEO) and the history of qualifying loan purchases by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, see JOHN WIEDEMER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 44, 78-86 (8th ed. 2001). 
Historical dollar limits of conventional loans can be found on Fannie Mae’s website, 
see  Fannie Mae Historical Conventional Loan Limits, FANNIE MAE (2011), 
http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/pdf/historicallimits.pdf.  For a discussion of 
recent developments (and lack of complete systemic reform), see Fannie Mae  
and Freddie Mac:  Unfinished Business, THE ECONOMIST (July 22, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/16640249. 
 44. See Loan Limits:  2011 Single-Family Mortgage Loan Limits, FANNIE MAE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/loanlimits.jhtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) 
(outlining the conforming loan limitations on first mortgages); see also Gail Cohen, 
How to Qualify for a Fannie Mae Loan, EHOW.COM, 
http://www.ehow.com/how_5107817_qualify-fannie-mae-loan.html.  
 45. Loan Limits:  2011 Single-Family Mortgage Loan Limits, FANNIE MAE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/loanlimits.jhtml (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).   
In 2010, the loan-to-value ratio of qualifying mortgages for GSE purchase was 97%; 
see also News Release:  Fannie Mae Implementing New Loan-to-Value Ceiling for Home 
Affordable Refinance Program; Loans Eligible for Delivery September 1, FANNIE MAE (July 1, 
2009), 
http://www.fanniemae.com/newsreleases/2009/4743.jhtml?p=Media&s=News+Rele
ases (stating Fannie Mae is temporarily increasing permitted loan-to-value ratio to 
over 100% for loan re-financings).  This ratio is almost certainly going to decrease in 
response to efforts to shore up GSE underwriting standards.  
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credit support of private mortgage insurance).46  The loan-to-value 
ratio for conforming mortgage decreased over the past few years, and 
currently is at 97%, although this amount will be soon lowered to 
90%.47  The maximum size of conventional first mortgages (those 
qualified for GSE repurchase) ranged from $93,750 in 1980 to 
$417,000 in 2007.48  In 2008, the Economic Stimulus Act increased 
GSE loan limits to $729,750;49 this change was renewed in the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 200850 and the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.51  These size increases were 
finally allowed to expire in 2010, decreasing the maximum dollar 
amount of conventional mortgages to $650,000.52 
Beginning in the 1980s, the GSEs began raising private capital to 
fund purchases of mortgages on the secondary market.53  Under this 
                                                          
 46. The charters of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac technically prohibit the 
acquisition of new mortgages with loan-to-value ratios in excess of 80%, but 
amendments to the charter allowed for lower ratios in combination with second 
mortgages or insurance.  The Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act, as 
amended through Oct. 28 1992, Title III of Nat’l Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. 1716 et seq., 
§ 302(b), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/pdf/charter.pdf.  The 
loan-to-value ratio cap was originally set at 75% and was changed in 1974.  Pub. L. 93-
383, § 806(c).  See also Dawn Kopecki, Obama’s Mortgage Plan for Fannie, Freddie May 
Face Legal Snag, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 24, 2009, available at 
 http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=alIg4Jsp56Vw.  The 
trend of decreasing loan-to-value ratios in conforming loans was criticized back in 
1997. Vern McKinley, The Mounting Case for Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
Cato Policy Analysis No. 293, Dec. 29, 1997, available at  
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-293.html#N_73_.  
 47. National Mortgage Network, FREDDIE MAC GUIDELINES, 
http://www.nationalmortgagenetwork.org/pdfs/market_conditions/Freddie-Mac-
LL-increase.pdf (last visited May 14, 2011).  In 2008, the GSEs set the loan-to-value 
limits based on whether the home was located in a distressed or declining state.  See 
Guidelines for Housing Finance Agencies, GENWORTH MORTGAGE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION (Oct. 6, 2008), 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mshda/mshda_genworth_underwriting_guid
elines_239205_7.pdf. 
 48. Fannie Mae Historical Conventional Loan Limits, FANNIE MAE (2011), 
http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/pdf/historicallimits.pdf.  The dollar cap of 
loan amounts is somewhat variable depending on geography.  For example, high cost 
areas (Hawai’i, New York, etc.) have higher limits based on an index maintained by 
the FHA.   
 49. Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–185, §§ 201-02, 122 Stat. 
613, 619–21 (2008). 
 50. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289, § 
1124(a)–(b), 122 Stat. 2654, 2691–93 (2008). 
 51. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115, 217, 220 (2009).  
 52. The Federal Housing Finance Agency maintained the heightened 
conforming loan maximum of $417,000 for single family homes and up to $729,750 
in certain high cost areas for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  See Lender Letter LL-
2010-13, EFANNIEMAE.COM (Nov. 19, 2010), https://www.efanniemae.com/ 
sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/ll1013.pdf.  In general, larger loans cost more and 
involve greater credit risk by concentrating finance capital among fewer borrowers.   
 53. See Basics of Fannie Mae MBS, FANNIE MAE, 
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structure, qualifying mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were put in a pool with hundreds and thousands of 
other loans, and private investors would buy shares of the mortgage-
backed pool (mortgage-backed securities or MBS), which would fund 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s purchase of still more mortgages.54  
The investors in GSE securities took on the interest rate and 
prepayment risks associated with the corresponding mortgages, but 
the GSE retained the credit risk by guarantying its investors that the 
principal on the underlying mortgage loans would be recovered.55  
Securitization of the secondary mortgage market completed the full 
transformation of the U.S. housing finance market.  The erstwhile 
community savings and loan model all but disappeared from 
mortgage lending and was replaced by a national (or even 
international) capital markets system, unlimited by geography or 
originating lender interest rate constraints.  With securitization, 
finance capital would naturally flow to where it was in greatest 
demand.  This new nationalized system of home finance not only 
made still more capital available for mortgage lending, as geographic 
constraints ceased to be a factor, but it also standardized home 
finance and all its elements (loan document terms, title insurance, 
credit and collateral appraisals, etc.).  In theory, this replaced a 
localized relationship-based system for assessing likelihood of 
borrower default with a system of more objective underwriting 
criteria such as credit scores, credit history, salary and employment 
data and data regarding a borrower’s other financial obligations.   
The modern capital markets also offered new opportunities for 
investors.  Mortgaged-backed securitization allows broader 
participation in the “lender” side of the real estate finance market.56  
Indeed, capital flocked to the U.S. housing market that offered safe 
investment options offering good returns.  This further increased the 
                                                          
 http://www.fanniemae.com/mbs/mbsbasics/index.jhtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) 
(providing brief overview of mortgage-backed securities). 
 54. See FABOZZI & MODIGLIANI, supra note 21.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac only 
securitized a portion of their loans; much of their mortgage purchases remained 
financed by corporate debt. 
 55. See Ingrid Gould Ellen, John Napier Tye & Mark A. Willis, Improving U.S. 
Housing Finance through Reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:  Assessing the Options, 
FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL’Y, N.Y.U SCHOOL OF LAW 30–31 (May 
2010), 30-31.  See generally W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, Fussing and Fuming 
over Fannie and Freddie:  How Much Smoke, How Much Fire? 19 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
159 (2005).   
 56. See DAVIDSON ET AL., supra note 34 at 3-4, 19-21, and 29-33.  Investor risk arises 
from various sources, including risk of loan default and non-repayment as well as risk 
of interest rate change and prepayment of mortgages.  
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flow of funds into mortgage lending, growing the U.S. housing and 
finance sectors.   
Investment in an asset-backed pool was considered safe for three 
reasons.  First, the process of securitization itself allowed investment 
risk to be spread because a single investment represented a pool of 
diverse interests.57  Securitization spreads the risk of default among 
many people and many properties, hedging against credit and 
prepayment risks posed by an individual borrower or a certain 
locality.58  The number of loans in the pool spread the risk of one 
borrower’s prepayment (or, if applicable, default) among the 
thousands of investors.  The geographic diversity of the pooled 
mortgages mitigated against localized risks, caused by fluctuations in 
asset value in one market or a certain community’s employment 
downturn.   
Second, the credit risk of mortgages generally was considered very 
low.  Originating lenders were expected to have conducted basic 
credit diligence on their borrowers by assessing the borrowers’ ability 
and willingness to meet their mortgage obligations.  In addition, even 
in the event of borrower default, the backup of collateral value 
underscored the ability of the lender to recover the value of the loan.  
During the boom years at the turn of the millennium, real property 
values were considered tremendously solid and ever-appreciating.59  
Indeed, mortgages had historically experienced a fairly low default 
rate and a valuable asset would cover all unpaid loan amounts in the 
unlikely event of default.  Securities sold by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac were guaranteed by the GSEs, so the credit risk associated with a 
pool of mortgages was retained by the issuer and not even passed on 
to investors.   
Finally, even if the entire system failed and the GSEs failed to cover 
the risk they had assumed and were unable to pay their investors, it 
                                                          
 57. Id.; see also Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course:  Predatory Lending, Securitization, 
and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 535–50 (2002) 
(describing the benefits of securitization to investors and lenders). 
 58. The structure of securitization in the abstract was not the problem; rather, it 
was the valuation model for securitized products that was inadequate.  For an 
overview comparison of securitization and traditional bank lending, see Gerald 
Hanweck, Anthony Sanders & Robert Van Order, Securitization versus Traditional 
Banks:  An Agnostic View of the Future of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Banks, FINREG 21 
(Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.finreg21.com/lombard-street/securitization-versus-
traditional-banks-an-agnostic-view-future-fannie-mae-freddie-mac (providing an 
overview comparison of securitization and traditional bank lending).  A concise 
description of the development of mortgage-backed securitization can be found at 
Eggert, supra note 57, at 535–49 (2002).   
 59. See generally JONATHAN NORBERG, CATO INST., FINANCIAL FIASCO:  HOW 
AMERICA’S INFATUATION WITH HOMEOWNERSHIP AND EASY MONEY CREATED THE 
ECONOMIC CRISIS (2009). 
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was widely believed that the federal government would step in and 
meet the payment obligations of these entities.  If such governmental 
backup existed (and we now know it did), then the GSE guaranties 
were implicitly supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government.60  Unsurprisingly, GSE debt securities acquired the 
highest credit rating.61 
The GSE secondary market and securitization system significantly 
sped up the flow of mortgage finance capital, making real estate 
values more liquid and keeping interest rates low.62  More capital 
flowing to the loan originators increased homeowner access to 
funding.  Increasing the supply of real estate capital also made 
financing cheaper, spurring lenders to increase borrower demand 
creatively by offering a broad spectrum of mortgage products, many 
of which promised little or no equity investment and small initial 
interest-only monthly payments.63  The ample supply of funds and 
rising demand for asset liquidity put upward pressure on real estate 
prices.64  As real properties appreciated, individual and aggregate 
asset wealth grew.65   
                                                          
 60. See Van Order, supra note 20. 
 61. See Understanding Fannie Mae Debt, FANNIE MAE, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/markets/debt/understanding_fm_debt/credit_ratings.j
html?p=Debt (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (describing Fannie Mae’s senior debt 
Aaa/AAA from each of the major ratings agencies; Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch).  
Although Freddie Mac’s preferred stock was downgraded to Baa3 (the lowest 
investment grade rating) in August 2008, Freddie Mac’s senior debt credit rating also 
remains Aaa/AAA from the ratings agencies.  See Associated Press, Freddie Mac Courts 
Investors, Buffett Passes, TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2008/08/24/2003421257. 
 62. See Van Order, supra note 20. 
 63. In the first half of 2005, for example, interest-only loans made up 28.5% of all 
mortgage loans, according to the mortgage data company Loan Performance.  
Suzanne Stewart & Ike Brannon, A Collapsing Housing Bubble?, 29 REGULATION 15, 16 
(Spring 2006) (calling the mortgage market of 2000-2005 “ultra-competitive” in 
terms of marketing loans to would-be borrowers); see also Jeff Madrick, How We Were 
Ruined & What We Can Do, in N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS Feb. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/feb/12/how-we-were-ruined-what-
we-can-do/; Ronald Colombo, A Crisis of Character, HUFFINGTON POST (May 12, 2009, 
4:58 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/ronald-j-colombo/a-crisis-of- 
character_b_202562.html; Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. OF 
DAYTON L. REV. 113, 113-37 (2009). 
 64. An increase in ability to pay for homes seems to create a pricing increase 
trend in homes.  This is true regardless of the source of the increase in capital.  
Ample debt capital availability due to the development of the secondary mortgage 
market and securitization has been supplemented by increased household salary 
earnings due to the increase of two-income earning families.  Elizabeth Warren and 
her daughter Amelia Warren Tyagi claim that the two-income trend drove home 
prices up, and ironically may have decreased the overall standard of living as well.  
ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO INCOME TRAP:  WHY MIDDLE-
CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003).  According to Warren and 
Tyagi, today’s two-income family earns on average 75% more money than its single-
income counterpart of a generation ago, but actually has less discretionary income 
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The securitized secondary market, then, served popular and 
reasonable goals:  creating a predictable source and predictable costs 
of mortgage capital, making real estate values more liquid, and 
increasing homeownership.  These outcomes worked in tandem to 
build what politicians have long called “the American Dream.”66  
Greater capital availability and access made homeownership 
increasingly realizable for all segments of society.67  The secondary 
market allowed banks to make long-term fixed-rate fully-amortizing 
loans, allowing homeowners to build equity over time.  Reliable credit 
availability preserved the value of homes as well.68  The appreciation 
of real estate and opportunity to build equity wealth through stable, 
fixed payments grew savings for millions of Americans, creating a nest 
egg of equity and appreciated value in their home.69 
In addition, the securitized secondary market encouraged 
profitable private investment in real estate, allowing the public goal 
of homeownership to be funded by private dollars (and pounds, 
                                                          
after paying fixed monthly bills (with the biggest single expenditure being housing).  
Id. at 50–52.  Robert Shiller agrees that the trend of two-income couples has 
expanded the availability of mortgage credit which has “propel[led] home prices.”  
ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005).  Interestingly, Shiller also 
credits the declining crime rate as a factor in home price increases, since “One can 
more comfortably flaunt wealth today, and so wealth has become more attractive.”  
Id. at 36. 
 65. The total value of residential property in developed countries rose by more 
than $30 trillion from 2000 to 2005, which was equivalent to 100% of those 
countries’ combined GDPs.  See In Come the Waves:  The Worldwide Rise in House Rrices is 
the Biggest Bubble in History.  Prepare for the Economic Pain when it Pops, THE ECONOMIST 
(June 16, 2005) [hereinafter In Come the Waves], available at 
 http://www.economist.com/node/4079027?story_id=4079027.  The investment and 
finance website The Motley Fool warned of a real estate bubble in 2005 and 
catalogued evidence of a runaway wealth effect.  Buck Hartzell, Real Estate Bubble? You 
Bet!, THE MOTLEY FOOL.COM (Oct. 26, 2005), http://www.fool.com/personal-
finance/retirement/2005/10/26/real-estate-bubble-you-bet.aspx.  From 1996 to 
2006, U.S. national average house prices rose between 93% and 137%.  See Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), House Price Appreciation Slows Further:  
OFHEO House Price Index Shows Declines in Five States, Continued Deceleration in Others, 
(2006), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=195; MAITLAND & 
BLITZER supra note 3, at 3 (illustrating that real estate prices dramatically rose 
between 1991 and 2005).  From 2001 to 2006, real estate values in seven 
metropolitan areas increased more than 80%.  Id.   
 66. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 67. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 68. Mortgage capital availability sets real estate liquidity, and more liquid real 
estate is more valuable.  Andrea J. Boyack, Lessons in Price Stability from the U.S. 
Real Estate Market Collapse 68 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=andrea_boyac
k. 
 69. David Min, Why the 30-Year Fixed-Rate Mortgage Is an Essential Part of Our 
Housing Finance System, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 2010/11/housing_reform.html.   But see 
Sanders & Lea, supra note 11 (arguing that a self-amortizing loan is an inefficient way 
to build wealth). 
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Euros, yen, etc.) and permitting individuals, municipalities, and 
companies to share the wealth of real estate appreciation.  The 
modern capital market also conquered geographical limitations on 
credit and investment in real estate. 
The majority of all U.S. residential mortgage loans today are 
components of these huge GSE-securitized pools of debt,70 with over 
50% of total residential mortgage debt being serviced through Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac investment structures.71  In terms of both 
market share and actual dollars, GSE securitized debt is huge:  at least 
$4.5 trillion, 83% of which is held by private investors.72   
The goals of the GSEs are politically popular ones:  broaden access 
to mortgage financing, particularly focusing on extending credit to 
under-served populations, and increase liquidity in real estate credit 
markets.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were established to provide 
counter-cyclical stability, and GSE securities were designed to be safe 
investment products.73  One thing is very clear:  the existence of 
Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae enabled large sums of money to flow 
into home mortgage lending.  Until the crisis, that was seen—on 
balance—to be a good thing. 
In addition to their huge contribution to the growth of 
homeownership in America, the GSEs played—and continue to 
                                                          
 70. See David Ellis, U.S. Seizes Fannie and Freddie, CNNMONEY.COM (Sept. 7, 2008, 
8:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09 
 /07/news/companies/fannie_freddie/index.htm (indicating that “half the 
mortgage debt in the country” was owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as of 
September 2008). 
 71. Id.; see Van Order, supra note 20, at 235; see also Staff of H.R. Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, the Role of Government Affordable Housing Policy in Creating the 
Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 111th Cong. 12 (2009).  Some 10–15% of outstanding 
residential mortgage debt is being serviced through similar “private label” systems.  
STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., THE 
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING POLICY IN CREATING THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008, at 12 (Comm. Print 2009).   
 72. According to James Lockhardt, Director of the regulatory oversight agency 
OFHEO.  See Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises:  
Hearing Before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, (Apr. 9, 2010) [hereinafter James 
Lockhardt Statement] (testimony of James B. Lockhardt), available at 
http://fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0409-Lockhart.pdf.  Other estimates put the 
debt as high as $5.4 trillion.  See Ellis, supra note 70.  Professor Anthony Sanders of 
George Mason and Member of Mercatus Center’s Financial Markets Working Group 
highlighted that the combined debt load for Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the 
Federal Home Loan Bank currently stands at $8 trillion.  See Hearing on Housing 
Finance—What Should the New System be Able to do?:  Part I—Government and Stakeholder 
Perspectives, H.R. Comm. on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 58 (2010) (Testimony of 
Anthony Sanders), available at http://mercatus.org/video/housing-finance-reform.   
 73. See generally Oversight Hearing to Examine Recent Treasury and FHFA Actions 
Regarding the Housing GSEs Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 36 
(2008) [hereinafter Testimony of Herbert Allison] (statement of Herbert M. Allison, 
Jr., President and CEO of Fannie Mae). 
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play—crucial roles in supporting the market for multifamily rental 
housing.  The GSEs are the primary lender for development of 
multifamily housing in the United States to the tune of $27 billion.74  
By attracting enormous amounts of private capital and allocating this 
capital to multifamily housing, the GSEs have contributed to the 
production of millions of units of market-rate rental housing.75  In 
fact, the United States has the best and most stable rental housing 
sector in the world,76 thanks in large part to the role of the GSEs.  
Other sources of long term investment capital, including banks, 
pension plans, and life insurance companies, have never been the 
predominant lenders for multifamily housing.77   
The multifamily housing sector financed by the GSEs has been—
and likely will continue to be—a critical part of our housing market.  
The number of Americans requiring rental housing is predicted to 
increase dramatically over the next few decades, due to changing 
demographics and immigration trends,78 and a stable and affordable 
supply of rental housing is critical to quality of life for median-income 
and lower-income populations.  People who cannot or do not desire 
to own a home still require housing, and it is far better for the 
taxpayer that this housing be supplied through an affordable market 
scheme rather than subsidized directly through government direct 
grants.  The GSEs achieved this tax-neutral outcome by providing 
sufficient capital to multifamily projects so that these units could be 
                                                          
 74. National Multi Housing Council Housing Finance Reform:  The Multifamily 
Perspective, [hereinafter NMHC Perspective] available at 
www.nmhc.org/Content/ContentList.cfm?NavID-435.  In 2008, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac provided capital for 84% of multi-family mortgage loans.  Nick 
Timiraos, Fannie, Freddie Woes Hurt Apartments, THE WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2009, at C1.  
Proposals regarding the GSEs have generally neglected to consider this aspect of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s market contribution, and it seemed unlikely (until 
the Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16), that this role would be endangered.  
Timiraos, supra note 74 (quoting Richard Campo, CEO of Camden Properties Trust 
as saying “[t]he idea that the government is going to do something negative to 
affordable housing in this interim period . . . seems pretty far-fetched”).  
 75. NMHC Perspective, supra note 74.  
 76. Id.; see also Letter from National Multi Housing Council, National Apartment 
Association and American Seniors Housing Association to Timothy F. Geithner, U.S. 
Treasury Secretary, and Shaun Donovan, HUD Secretary, dated July 21, 2010, Re:  
Public Input on Reform of the Housing Finance System, eDocket Number:  Treas-
DO-2010-001 and HUD-2010-0029. 
 77. A Responsible Market for Rental Housing Finance:  Envisioning the Future of the U.S. 
Secondary Market for Multifamily Residential Rental Mortgages, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Oct. 2010) [hereinafter, Rental Housing Finance], available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/pdf/multifamilyhousingreport.p
df. 
 78. See State of the Nation’s Housing 2010, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. U. 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 Harvard Housing Study]; America’s Rental Housing:  The Key 
to a Balanced National Policy, JOINT CT. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. U. (2008) 
[hereinafter 2008 Harvard Housing Study]; Rental Housing Finance, supra note 77. 
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rented to middle- and low-income families without any government 
subsidy.79  About 90% of the units financed through Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac provide such good housing options at zero taxpayer 
cost.80  The vast bulk of below-market housing costs, on the other 
hand, are provided through the FHA.81 
Not only is providing market liquidity for multifamily housing of 
vital societal import, but it carries little taxpayer risk as well.  To date, 
there have been very few defaults in the multifamily sector; less than 
1% of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s guarantied multifamily loans 
have defaulted.82  While some of the loans made to multifamily rental 
housing projects have been securitized in pools similar to single 
family home loans, most of the multifamily loans purchased by the 
GSEs remain in their portfolios.83  Multifamily loans are usually 
individually bigger than single-family home loans, and the 
transactions are more idiosyncratic than residential mortgages.  
Larger individual loans make the risk harder to spread through 
pooling (multifamily loan pools typically have fewer, larger 
mortgages), and lower uniformity of these transactions increases the 
costs of credit and collateral due diligence as well as the cost of 
pricing and underwriting the loans.84   
                                                          
 79. See Rental Housing Finance, supra note 77. 
 80. Id.  The multifamily housing sector was “holding up the best” even at the 
height of the crisis, but industry experts worried that if the GSEs focused on their 
single family problems and ignored multi-family lending, that could change. Michael 
Stoler, Fannie, Freddie, and the Multifamily Market, THE N.Y. SUN, Sept. 18, 2008. 
 81. Anthony Pennington-Cross and Anthony M. Yezer, The Federal Housing 
Administration in the New Millennium, 11 J. OF HOUSING RESEARCH 357 (2000). 
 82. NMHC Perspective, supra note 74; Rental Housing Finance, supra note 77, at 
10-12. 
 83. NMHC Perspective, supra note 74; Ellen et al., supra note 55, at 6. 
 84. Commercial loans generally share these characteristics as well:  they are 
larger, more idiosyncratic and less uniform.  In addition, there is no federal or quasi-
federal agency guaranty for commercial loans, so all commercial mortgage lending 
operates outside the GSE sphere.  This is why commercial lending lagged residential 
mortgage backed securitization both in terms of timing (starting later historically) 
and in terms of volume (lower amounts of CMBS).  Deutsche Bank Research, 
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS FACING REFINANCING RISKS:  CMBS ONLY PART OF A 
GROWING PROBLEM 7–9 (July 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-
PROD/PROD0000000000259822.pdf.  The only time CMBS volume represented 
significant market share was in the five to ten years prior to the housing crisis, 
suggesting it was fueled by over-speculation rather than stable investment capital 
choices.  Global CMBS issuance hit its highest point ever in 2007 at a volume of $324 
billion—five times the volume of 2000.  Then the CMBS market plummeted over the 
following year to $25 billion in 2008—only about 10% of its value just the year 
before.  Id. at 8; see also John Levy, CMBS Volume Hits Record High, NAT’L REAL ESTATE 
INVESTOR (Aug. 1, 2005), available at 
http://nreionline.com/commentary/finance/real_estate_cmbs_volume_hits/.   
In 2008, however, CMBS volume fell dramatically and has yet to recover.  See, e.g., Al 
Yoon, CMBS Volume Now Seen Plunging to Six-Year Low, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2008), 
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B. Systemic and GSE Failures 
As soon as the dust from the housing and financial crises had 
settled in 2009, the world began trying to find somebody to blame.  
The GSEs had helped to create the modern mortgage market system 
of secondary purchases of loans, which were pooled, securitized and 
sold as investments.  The private market built upon this foundation, 
securitizing increasingly risky mortgages and inventing insurance 
products that freed more capital to create more loans.85  Without the 
secondary market, there would be no capital to create the volume of 
mortgages that were originated in the decades before the collapse.  
Without Wall Street, the insurers of securities, and credit rating 
agencies, there would have been no market for risky mortgage-
backed securities.  And without the huge global growth of capital 
markets since the 1980s, there would have been insufficient 
investment funds to significantly increase the quantity of lending.  
While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not market the risky 
securities themselves, they did help engineer the MBS concept and 
context, allowing the private issuers eventually to do so.  
Furthermore, toward the end of the boom years, the GSEs began to 
partake of increased credit and market risk themselves.  
After four decades of providing safe, well-underwritten loans for 
single family and multifamily housing, something went wrong with 
the GSE model and the housing market in general.  The failure of 
the GSEs to remain solvent was caused by a combination of four 
factors:  (1) the GSEs’ loss of the protection of reliable mortgage 
underwriting standards; (2) the moral hazard of implicit government 
guaranties, coupled with a profit structure that rewarded quantity 
rather than quality, which encouraged risk-taking; (3) the significant 
market presence of the GSEs, which made them more vulnerable to 
general economic downturns; and, (4) the GSEs’ lack of adequate 
capital reserves to cushion a significant market downturn.  
Interestingly, however, none of these factors were unique to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac—other large institutional players in the home 
                                                          
http://www.reuters.com/ article/idUSN0342726520080403; Jim Clayton, P&Ls:  
Pricing, Liquidity and Leverage, PREA QUARTERLY 46–52 (Winter 2009), available at  
http://www.cornerstoneadvisers.com/_pdf/P&Ls.pdf.  The drop in volume has been 
so dramatic that comparative sales pricing for CMBS products is currently 
unreliable—there simply is not enough liquidity for any reliable market pricing of 
the real-estate-backed securities to exist.  Multifamily housing has not suffered (yet), 
since it is still supported through GSE secondary market purchasing. 
 85. See Eggert, supra note 57, at 535–36 (describing how the private sector’s 
ability to securitize separately from the GSEs was bolstered by the investor confidence 
resulting from credit rating agencies assigning ratings to securities produced). 
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mortgage capital markets suffered the same sorts of failings.  Nearly 
every depository institution in the United States is subject to an 
explicit guaranty in the form of FDIC insurance,86 and the 
government’s bailout of investment banks and insurance companies 
proves that these institutions had the benefit of a somewhat implicit 
guaranty as well.87  Since both accounting rules and banking 
regulations have since adjusted in reaction to a presumption that 
private label entities lacked sufficient capital cushion,88 that factor 
held true for private issuers as well.  In some ways, the failings of the 
GSEs were actually less extreme:  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held 
far less risky securities and guaranties than their private label MBS-
issuer counterparts, and private issuer lapses persisted over a longer 
period of time.89   
1. Lack of Adequate Underwriting 
Starting in the 1990s, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac started 
delegating the underwriting of the loans they would purchase, 
guaranty, and securitize to the originating lenders.  Given that losses 
on qualified mortgage lending were historically small, it made sense 
to save costs on underwriting by delegating this task, designating an 
originator as an “approved lender,” and relying on that originator’s 
credit diligence to support the loan’s viability.90  Under the delegated 
                                                          
 86. Hanweck et al., supra note 58. 
 87. The initial 2008 Wall Street bailout plan was for $700 billion, though later 
estimates suggest that the true cost may be hundreds of billions more.  See Deborah 
Solomon, David Enrich & Jon Hilsenrath, New Bank Bailout Could Cost $2 Trillion, THE 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123319689681827391.html; see also Goldfarb & ElBoghdady, supra note 10. 
 88. Private label securitization “promoted the riskiest mortgages” and 
consistently have experienced default rates twice that of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. Robert Van Order, Privatization Won’t Reduce Risk, THE N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 
2011. 
 89. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text; see also Susanna Montezemolo, 
Wall Street, Not Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, Created & Led the Toxic Mortgage Market, CTR. 
FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING HILL BRIEF, Jan. 25, 2011 [hereinafter CRL BRIEF] 
(explaining that the GSEs “were followers, not leaders, in the events leading up to 
today’s foreclosure epidemic”). 
 90. Fannie Mae’s automated underwriting system, Desktop Underwriter, and 
Freddie Mac’s system, Loan Prospector, became fully operational in 1997.  Theresa 
R. DiVenti, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:  Past, Present and Future, 11 CITYSCAPE:  A J. OF 
POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH 231 (2009); see also Susan Wharton Gates, Vanessa Gail Perry 
& Peter Zorn, Automated Underwriting in Mortgage Lending:  Good News for the 
Underserved?  13 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 369 (2002).  When Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac expanded their purchases to include Alt-A and other poorly documented loans, 
Fannie Mae implemented the Expanded Approval system and Freddie Mac 
expanded its Loan Prospector system to accommodate these offerings.  DiVenti, 
supra note 90, at 236.  FHA went to delegated underwriting under the Direct 
Endorsement Lender Review and Approval Process (DELRAP) program in 2010.  
HUD ML 2009-46B.  Recent audits of FHA loans raise doubts as to the efficacy of 
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underwriting model, approved lenders performed their own 
underwriting according to enumerated GSE underwriting criteria; 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did spot checks.91  This delegated 
underwriting system worked fairly well until 2006, but as risky lending 
became more frequent and widespread in the broader housing 
market, poorly underwritten loans began moving into GSE portfolios 
and pools as well.92  In this way, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac slowly—
but eventually—followed market trends.  Ironically, their delayed 
adoption condemned them to participating in the worst abuses of 
credit diligence in history.93   
Even with delegated underwriting, the GSEs had managed to stay 
away from overly risky mortgage loans for decades.  In fact, until 
2005, it appears that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had stayed true to 
their original business model:  buying and guarantying fully 
documented, high quality mortgages.94  During the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, however, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac lost 
market share as more and more mortgages were originated for resale 
to private label MBS issuers on the secondary market.95  Many of these 
underlying mortgages were unqualified for purchase by the GSEs.  
Some were “jumbo loans,” too big for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s 
loan amount cap—then around $400,000.96  Some were subprime 
                                                          
delegated underwriting:  49% of FHA loans today do not meet underwriting 
standards. Joy Leopold, HUD Losses From Noncomplying FHA Loans Top $11M, 
DSNEWS.COM (Mar. 9. 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/hud-losses-from-
noncomplying-fha-loans-top-11m-2011-03-09. 
 91. Peter Mahoney & Peter Zorn, The Promise of Automated Underwriting:  Freddie 
Mac’s Loan Prospector, HOUS. FIN. INT’L 13, available at 
 http://www.housingfinance.org/uploads/Publicationsmanager/ 9706_Aut.pdf. 
Automatic underwriting was heralded as a huge step forward to increasing 
homeownership particularly among underserved populations.  See Peter Zorn, Susan 
Gates & Vanessa Gail Perry, Automated Underwriting and Lending Outcomes:  The Effect of 
Improved Mortgage Risk Assessment on Underserved Populations, FISHER CTR. FOR REAL 
ESTATE AND URBAN ECONS., U.  CAL., BERKLEY, C01-008 (Aug. 2001). 
 92. See Conservator Report, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (August 26, 2010) [hereinafter 
Conservator Report], available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/16591/ 
ConservatorsRpt82610.pdf. 
 93. See supra note 65; infra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 94. The Treasury/HUD Report explains that not only did the GSEs insist on high 
quality, fully documented loans prior to 2006, but by establishing “appropriate 
benchmarks for conforming loans” they were able to “improve [underwriting] 
standards within the broader mortgage industry.” Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 
16, at 4. 
 95. The GSEs purchased 70% of new mortgage originations in 2003, but by 2006, 
GSE purchases represented only 40% of the market for new mortgage secondary 
market sales. Ellen et al., supra note 56; James B. Lockhart III, Speech at the American 
Securitization Forum, Las Vegas, NV, Feb. 9, 2009, available at 
www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/823/ASFSpeech2909.pdf. 
 96. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.  The jumbo market, 
representing loans for larger, more expensive homes, remains in grave peril, lacking 
sufficient capital.  See Robert Frank, Foreclosures on Million-Dollar Homes Surge, THE 
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loans, which by definition were too risky for resale to the GSEs.97  The 
loss of market share inspired Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
shareholders to put pressure on the companies to increase their 
mortgage purchases; one way they did so was to expand mortgage 
purchasing for low documentation loans.98  Shareholders of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac hoped to share in the widespread money-
making from the inflated mortgage market.  Meanwhile, the 
government signaled that wide access to housing finance credit 
remained a priority for the institutions, and even pushed for greater 
access to credit for lower income would-be owners.99   
                                                          
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 27, 2008), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26869897/ns/business-
real_estate/. 
 97. From 2001 to 2006, the volume of Subprime and Alt-A loans quintupled, 
from $0.2 trillion in 2001 to $1.0 trillion in 2006. By 2008, volume had contracted to 
only $0.1trillion.  See Inside Mortgage Finance data. 
 98. Alt-A loans were not technically subprime because mortgage borrowers had 
sufficient down payments and Fair Isaac Corporation (“FICO”) scores.  The biggest 
failing of Alt-A loans was lack of income and asset documentation.  In 2008, Charles 
W. Calomiris and Peter J. Wallison condemned Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the 
pages of The Wall Street Journal for “aggressively buying of subprime and Alt-A 
mortgages and mortgage-backed securities” motivated by “desperate attempt to 
recover market share from the investment banks.”  Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J. 
Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess, THE WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 
2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122212948811465427.html.  While Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac did buy some top-tranche securities from subprime pools, the 
loss from such holdings have been less significant than losses due to guarantied Alt-A 
loans, and interestingly the purchases of subprime MBS top tranches may have been 
motivated by an attempt to fulfill their low housing investment requirements. 
 99. In 2003, former House Financial Services Committee chair Barney Frank, for 
example, effectively instructed the GSEs to concentrate on affordable housing and 
implied that Congress would support this mission in spite of potential credit loss 
risks.  See H.R. 2575, The Secondary Mortgage Market Enterprises Regulatory Improvement 
Act, Sep. 25, 2003, Hearing before the Committee on Financial Services, Serial No. 108-54.  
Frank argued for broader credit availability spearheaded by the GSEs.  Id. (“Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac do very good work, and they are not endangering the fiscal 
health of this country.”).  Frank argued for greater attention to affordable housing 
by the GSEs as well as downplaying any risk for extending more housing credit.  Id. 
(“[W]e, as the Federal Government, have probably done too little rather than too 
much to push them to meet the goals of affordable housing . . . people exaggerate a 
threat of safety and soundness, the more people conjure up the possibility of serious 
financial losses to the Treasury, which I do not see . . . .  I do not want to see any 
lessening of our commitment to getting low-income housing.”).  In addition, scholars 
in the 1990s and early 2000s had argued for reduced credit and down payment 
barriers to entry for homeownership, citing data generated by the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) reporting requirements on low income credit availability to 
indict the banking industry for implicitly discriminating against minority 
populations.  The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. 2801; see also 
www.ffiec.gov/hmda.  For a detailed description of the HMDA data see Glenn Canner 
& Dolores Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act:  Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 
77 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN, 859 (November 1991).  For scholarly interpretation of this 
data and calls for lowering barriers to credit availability, see, e.g., Alicia Munnell, 
Geoffrey Tootell, Lynn Browne & James McEneaney, Mortgage Lending in Boston:  
Interpreting HMDA Data, 86 THE AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996); What We Know About 
Mortgage Lending Discrimination in America, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., OFFICE 
OF POL’Y DEV. & RESEARCH (1999), available at 
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There were several significant failings in the mortgage market in 
the first decade of this millennium, and by ramping up purchases of 
loans and MBS, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac joined in and suffered 
from the system’s failures.  First, actors at each stage of the mortgage 
finance system were being compensated based on loan volume rather 
than loan performance.  Sometimes this failing is phrased as “having 
no skin in the game.”100  Volume-based compensation created 
financial incentives for each market player that encouraged more 
and riskier loans rather than quality, well-underwritten mortgage 
products.  For example, brokers and originators were paid based on 
loan size and loan volume and, in particular, yield spread.101  The 
more loans that were originated, the bigger the brokers’ paychecks 
and the more originators profited, in terms of fees as well as resale 
costs.  The originate-to-distribute model motivated the primary 
mortgage market participants to focus on churning paper rather than 
accurately underwriting credit risk.102  Ironically, the riskiest loans 
sometimes yielded the biggest payouts for originators who charged 
and retained larger upfront fees and incentivized mortgage brokers 
to do the same.   
                                                          
http://archives.hud.gov/news/1999/newsconf/intro.html; Margery Turner & 
Felicia Skidmore, Mortgage Lending Discrimination:  A Review of Existing Evidence, THE 
URBAN INST. (1999), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=309090; John 
Goodman, Jr. & Joseph Nichols, Does FHA Increase Home Ownership or Just Accelerate It? 
6 J. OF HOUS. ECON. 184 (1997).  The House Banking Committee cited such data in 
calls for greater moves to increase credit access by reducing credit and collateral 
requirements.  Stuart S. Rosenthal, Eliminating Credit Barriers To Increase 
Homeownership:  How Far Can We Go?, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. U. (Aug. 
2001), at 6.  There were, however, calls to reign in the GSEs even at a cost to credit 
accessibility.  In 2005, the Senate Banking Committee adopted a bill introduced by 
Sens. Elizabeth Dole, John Sununu and Chuck Hegel, The Federal Housing 
Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act of 2005, S. 190, that would have beefed up 
prudential regulation of the GSEs. Every Democrat voted against this bill and it failed 
to pass. See Stephen Labaton, New Agency Proposed to Oversee Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae, THE N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003; Charles Calomiris & Peter Wallison, Blame Fannie 
Mae and Congress for the Credit Mess, THE WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2008. 
 100.  E.g., Christopher M. James, Mortgage Backed Securities:  How Important is “Skin 
in the Game?” FRBSF ECON. LETTER 2010-37 (December 13 2010); Stan Liebowitz, New 
Evidence on the Foreclosure Crisis, THE WALL ST. J., July 3, 2009.  Although H.R. 4173, § 
1403, et seq. mandates a 5% risk retention piece for originators of non-qualified 
residential mortgages, any originators of mortgages meeting the qualified residential 
mortgage requirements will be exempt from the risk retention requirement.   
See Ronald D. Orol, FDIC’s Plan for ‘Skin in the Game’ Loans, MARKETWATCH.COM 
(March 28, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/fdics-plan-for-skin-in-the-
game-loans-2011-03-28?siteid=rss&rss=1. 
 101. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 558–559 
(4th ed. 2001).  The Dodd-Frank Act now prohibits yield spread premium broker 
compensation which created incentives for steering borrowers to higher-interest 
loans.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.  
111-517, § 1403, 124 Stat. 1376–2223 (2010).   
 102. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 133, at 382. 
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Volume-based compensation was mirrored in the secondary market 
as well.  Churning paper into securitized mortgage-backed pools 
attracted more investment funds, and Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and 
the private label securitizers all stood to profit from increased 
quantity in U.S. mortgage backed securities.  Issuers of MBS were 
paid based on volume of securities produced rather than the quality 
of the loans pooled.103 
In the securitized secondary market, risk of loss was segmented, 
deferred, and shifted, which essentially caused market participants to 
operate without recognizing any potential downside anchor.  Because 
originators did not retain mortgages in their portfolio, they incurred 
no direct risk for originating mortgages with higher-than-typical 
credit risk.104  Secondary market purchasers who were able to pass 
along credit risk to their investors were similarly unconcerned with 
ultimate loan repayment.105  The GSEs retained credit risk, but fell 
prey to the same market thinking of other securitizers:  that mortgage 
lenders bore very little risk of principal repayment because of (a) 
underwriting and (b) ever-appreciating collateral backing up the 
obligation.106  
After some internal debate as to the wisdom of aggressively 
pursuing market share by lowering underwriting standards,107 Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac finally started to increase market share by 
                                                          
 103. Prior to 2007, credit risk for mortgages was widely seen as minimal in all 
MBS, whether that risk was retained by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the GSE-
securities model or passed on to investors under the private label securities model.  
Historically, losses had been quite low, and credit rating agencies blessed the concept 
of securitization as a risk-spreading tool by granting such securities the highest 
ratings.  Risk of loss was further mitigated through extensive insurance and re-
insurance offerings for the securitizers.  The combination of history, insurance and 
credit ratings painted a risk-free picture for investors, securitizers and lenders alike. 
 104. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13 at 381-82; see also LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & 
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, THE PANIC OF 2008:  CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR REFORM (2010); Boyack, supra note 68. 
 105. Interest rate and prepayment risks in loans sold and securitized through the 
“private-label system” were passed on to investors who thus “required a higher yield 
to absorb this risk.”  Jaffe, supra note 9.  The private secondary market promoted 
riskier mortgages and felt greater losses.  Van Order, supra note 88.  In addition, it 
was the private-label market (in particular the run on the shadow banking system 
issuing “deposit-like instruments (e.g., repurchase agreements and commercial 
paper securitization)” that was the “source of the panic and subsequent credit 
crunch.”  Id. 
 106. See, e.g., Norberg, supra note 59. 
 107. For example, Freddie Mac’s former chief risk officer, David A. Andrukonis 
reportedly warned the company that it was buying bad loans that “would likely pose 
an enormous financial and reputational risk to the company and the country,” but 
this warning went unheeded.  Charles Duhigg, At Freddie Mac, Chief Discarded Warning 
Signs, THE N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2008.  Andrukonis left the company over this dispute. 
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pursuing riskier business investments in late 2005/early 2006.108  The 
GSEs began to guaranty new and riskier mortgage products, 
including in particular Alt-A loans that lacked traditional credit 
documentation.109  By aggressively pursuing Alt-A loans—those with 
sufficient loan-to-value ratios but little or nothing in the way of 
documented borrower earnings and assets—the GSEs exposed 
themselves to a significant increase of credit risk.110  Commentators, 
                                                          
 108. This resulted from delegated underwriting as well as an expansion of what 
mortgage products would be eligible for purchase (especially Alt-A).  Involvement 
with loans falling below underwriting standards has exposed Fannie Mae executives 
to a massive class action lawsuit for “accounting fraud”.  See In re Fannie Mae 
Securities Litigation, Consolidated Civil Action No.:  1:04-CV-01639 (D.C. Dist. Ct.), 
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1032/FNM04- 
01/200534_r03c_04cv01639.pdf.  There is evidence that non-eligible products also 
snuck in to GSE pools or portfolios through the backdoor.  In addition to buying 
questionable mortgages, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac invested in questionable 
mortgage backed securities.  Investigations are currently underway regarding to what 
extent Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were misled with respect to the mortgage-
backed securities they purchased at the height of the boom.  Nick Timiraos, U.S. 
Queries 64 Issuers of Mortgage Securities, Others, THE WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704288204575362882033038278.h
tml.  Many in government (including now-government-outsiders John Sununu and 
Elizabeth Dole) have called Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac drivers of the crisis by their 
purchase of Alt-A securities, allowing such loans to be securitized.  For a brief 
description of these loan types, see supra note 98.  The culpability of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac is debatable.  See Christopher Lewis Peterson, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, 
and the Home Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 149 (2009); see also 
Hanweck et al., supra note 58.  In addition, even if credit risk was appropriately 
included in pricing, since debt securities represent a future stream of income rather 
than a currently available liquid—or even liquidatable—asset, there is a liquidity risk 
factor as well.  As we see today, the lack of liquidity lessens the ability to price 
securities (lack of comparable sales) as well.   
 109. Alt-A loans are loans that have characteristics of prime loans (for example, 
high FICO scores, adequate down payments) but have less than full documentation 
of income and wealth.  Alt-A loans may be “stated income,” meaning there is no 
independent verification of borrower income (pay stubs, W-2 forms, tax returns, etc.) 
and borrowers simply certify to their own ability to pay.  
 110. While at the time, the risk of Alt-A loans was not well understood, data since 
the housing crisis supports the allegation that stated income loans were significantly 
more risky than their verified income counterparts.  In August 2006, Steven 
Krystofiak, president of the Mortgage Brokers Association for Responsible Lending, 
in a statement at a Federal Reserve hearing on mortgage regulation, reported that 
his organization had compared a sample of 100 stated income mortgage applications 
to IRS records, and found almost 60% of the sampled loans had overstated their 
income by more than 50 percent.  Steven Krystofiak, Statement at the Federal 
Reserve 4 (Aug. 1, 2006), available at  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-
1253_3_1.pdf; Mark Gimein, Inside the Liar Loan:  How the Mortgage Industry Nurtured 
Deceit, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2189576.  Speaking of “liar 
loans,” Slate magazine opined that the “simplest aspect of the crisis to understand” is 
also the “most troubling, because it’s not about complicated financial dealings and 
can’t be fixed with bailouts. It’s about an astounding breakdown of social norms.”  Id.  
The GSEs also increased their loan size limits by nearly two-fold, but this increase was 
only truly significant in increasing volume after the housing meltdown began.  Mark 
Calabria of the Cato Institute estimates that a quarter of all loans purchased by 
Fannie Mae in 2005, and 10% of all loans purchased by Freddie Mac in 2005, was 
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such as Robert M. Diamond and Clifford J. Treese, called for a return 
to traditional underwriting standards for the GSEs as early as 2006,111 
but such prophets of reason were unheeded in the mad rush to grow 
company profits during the peak of the housing boom. 
In retrospect, we now know that the GSEs grew market share at the 
worst possible time.  Residential mortgages originated in 2006 and 
2007 were the most poorly underwritten loans in history.112  This was 
partially in response to mortgage lender efforts to pump up new loan 
originations to feed the secondary market and investor demand for 
securities backed by these loans.  The massive increase in volume of 
mortgages originated during this time represents some shockingly 
risky and unrealistic loans, including numerous types of non-
documented financings (so-called “liar loans”).113  In addition, many 
of these originations represented re-financing rather than new home 
purchasers, since lenders were quantity-driven and allowed and 
encouraged homeowners to take out new or additional loans in order 
to “cash out” their equity.  Investor demand and the originate-to-
distribute model sped the decline in underwriting, as did the 
willingness of mortgage borrowers to enjoy cheap and easy credit and 
to take out loans they had no realistic prospect of repaying, blinded 
by trust in mortgage brokers and originators and by the overly 
optimistic hope of eternal market expansion.114 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were among the largest consumers of 
these bad-vintage mortgages.115  During these last two years of the 
                                                          
from Countrywide.  Kerri Panchuk, GSEs Inflated Subprime Balloon Before it Popped, 
CATO INST. (March 15, 2011), http://www.housingwire.com/2011/03/15/gses-
inflated-subprime-balloon-before-it-popped-cato-institute. 
 111. Clifford Treese, Robert Diamond & Katherine Rosenberry, Changing 
Perspectives on Community Association Mortgage Underwriting and Credit Analysis, 
RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM. REPORT, Nov. 1, 2001; Ross Guberman, Fannie Mae 
Projects a Happy Image.  But as Its Debt Grows Bigger and Its Executives Get Richer, Should 
Taxpayers Start to Worry?  THE WASHINGTONIAN, Aug. 2002. 
 112. Thematic Review on Mortgage Underwriting and Origination Practices, Peer Review 
Report, FIN. STABILITY BD., Mar. 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/ r_110318a.pdf, 17-22.   
 113.  As no-document and no-income loans became so common even their 
acronyms enjoyed widespread comprehension (NINA and NINJA loans, for 
example).  Alt-A loans are loans that have characteristics of prime loans (e.g., good 
credit history) but have less than full documentation of income and wealth.  A stated 
income loan occurs where there is no independent verification of borrower income 
(no examination of pay stubs, W-2 forms, tax returns, etc.) and borrowers simply 
certify to their own ability to pay. 
 114. See Boyack, supra note 68, at 125-28.  
 115. In 2008, Charles W. Calomiris and Peter J. Wallison condemned Fannie and 
Freddie in the pages of The Wall Street Journal for the “aggressive buying of 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages and mortgage-backed securities” by the GSEs).  
Charles W. Calomiris & Peter J. Wallison, Blame Fannie Mae and Congress for the Credit 
Mess, THE WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB: 
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housing bubble—2006 and 2007—the GSEs aggressively pursued 
mortgage purchases for securitization and for their own portfolio 
holdings.116  This was at the height of the housing bubble, a time 
when warnings of over-inflated mortgage-backed products began to 
be more insistent and the most knowledgeable investors and lenders 
were getting out while they still could.117  Investment guru and icon 
Warren Buffett once described the cycle of market bubbles  
as successively attracting three “I”-categories of investors:  first, 
“innovators” (who imagine and take advantage of new market 
products); second, “imitators” (who recognize a new opportunity and 
perfectly catch a market swell); and finally “idiots” (who get into the 
market at the worst possible time, just before the crash).118  Poor 
timing led the GSEs to try their hand at surfing the risky mortgage 
wave only to end up in a spectacular wipeout. 
The fragility of the subprime mortgage market was apparent by 
2007,119 and by 2008, the multiplication of mortgage defaults and the 
                                                          
SB122212948811 465427.html.  Dean Baker has also condemned Fannie and Freddie 
for “jumping into junk mortgages near the end of the bubble,” a move which, he 
says, has little to do with extending credit to would-be homebuyers and rather was all 
about market share.  Dean Baker, Opposing View on Housing Finance:  Go Back to the Old 
Design, USA TODAY, June 4, 2010.  Washington Post reporters concur with this 
assessment. Binyamin Applebaum, Carol D. Leonnig & David S. Hilzenrath, How 
Washington Failed to Rein In Fannie, Freddie, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008, at A1 The 
testimony of President and CEO of Fannie Mae lends support to this as well.  See 
Opening Statement by Daniel Mudd to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Apr. 
17, 2007, available at http://www.fanniemae.com/media/ 
speeches/printthispage.jhtml?repID=/media/speeches/2007/ speech_267.html. 
 116. Calomiris, supra note 115.  Dean Baker has also condemned Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac for “jumping into junk mortgages near the end of the bubble,” a move 
which, he says, has little to do with extending credit to would-be homebuyers and 
rather was all about market share.  Dean Baker, Opposing View on Housing Finance:  Go 
Back to the Old Design, USA TODAY (June 4, 2010), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2010-06-04-
editorial04_ST1_N.htm.  Washington Post reporters concur with this assessment.  See 
Binyamin Appelbaum, Carol D. Leonnig & David S. Hilzenrath, How Washington 
Failed to Rein In Fannie, Freddie, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2008,  at A1.  The 
testimony of President and CEO of Fannie Mae lends support to this as well.  See 
Opening Statement by Daniel Mudd to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, Apr. 
17, 2007, available at http://www.fanniemae.com/media/ 
speeches/printthispage.jhtml?repID=/media/speeches/2007/ speech_267.html. 
 117. See, e.g., In Come the Waves, supra note 65; Andrew Laperriere, Housing Bubble 
Trouble:  Have We Been Living Beyond Our Means?, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Apr. 10, 
2006), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/ 
012/053ajgwr.asp.  
 118. In an October 1, 2008 televised interview, Warren Buffett explained that 
there is a “natural progression” to boom-bust business cycles and a typical trend in 
market bubble investment.  He called the progression the “three I’s”—namely (in 
chronological order), innovators, imitators and idiots.  See Charlie Rose (Oct. 1, 2008), 
available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/9284.  
 119. See Sanders, supra note 29.  The “subprime” segment of the market typically 
refers to mortgage loans made to borrowers with FICO credit bureau scores below 
620 or 660 or loans originated by a lender specializing in subprime loans or loans 
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collapse of inflated home values in several key markets put the entire 
housing market in crisis.  As MBS values plummeted along with 
collateral values, the housing finance market imploded, taking 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac down with it.120  In cases where 
originator breach of representations and warranties to the GSEs 
might have justified “putting” the mortgages back to the primary 
lenders (e.g., Countrywide) in order to offset credit losses, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac refrained because many such originators 
lacked the assets and stability to compensate secondary purchasers.121 
2. Moral Hazard 
With the hindsight available in 2011, many wonder why competent 
capital providers allowed so much credit risk to be created without 
accounting for its cost or assessing its risk.  Mortgage lending became 
overly risky because under the modern housing market system 
structure, each party rationally did not care about credit risk.  
Mortgage brokers did not care about ultimate loan performance, as 
they were paid based on total loan amount and yield-spread 
premiums.122  Originating lenders did not care about underwriting 
since they were not going to hold poorly conceived loans in their 
portfolios anyway; they were going to immediately sell them to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac (or a private label securitizer).123  The GSEs 
and other MBS issuers did not care about underwriting because of 
the huge investor demand for their securities.124  Plus, the issuers had 
                                                          
with a high coupon interest rate. See Howard Lax et al., Subprime Lending:  An 
Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 533, 536–537 (2004), 
available at http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/documents/58731.pdf. 
 120. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
 121. Ronel Elul, Nicholas S. Souleles, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Dennis 
Glennon, & Robert Hunt, What “Triggers” Mortgage Default? (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 10-13, April 2010).  Bank of America, as successor 
to the prolific second mortgage lender Countrywide, has recently been sued (again) 
for failing to disclose the existence of second mortgages on loans sold on the 
secondary market Dexia Holdings v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 650185/2011 (N.Y. 
Sup. St.), available at 
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=tirVQe
wp3WuiTF+/gZlMUw==&system=prod. 
 122. See Boyack, supra note 68, at n.126, 145-50 and accompanying text.  
 123. Id. at 25.  
 124. From 2000 to 2008, investor capital in mortgage backed securities more than 
doubled.  See Anatomy of a Meltdown, The Credit Crisis:  A Three-Part Series on the U.S. 
Housing Bust, THE WASH. POST, June 15-17, 2008 (chart showing global investments 
2000-2008).  “Wall Street had no shortage of customers for subprime products, 
including pension funds and investors in places such as Asia and the Middle East, 
where wealth had blossomed over the past decade.” Id.; Alec Klein & Zachary 
Goldfarb, The Bubble, THE WASH. POST, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/credicrisis. 
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obtained insurance to cover any losses.125  MBS investors likely did not 
care as well:  they were getting a great deal because these investments 
had low historical losses and because GSE securities came with a 
company guaranty implicitly backed by the federal government, 
making the chance of default-based losses minute.126  Any investor 
doubts as to the safety of mortgage backed securities were assuaged 
by credit rating agencies who blessed these investments—both GSE-
issued and private label—as safe.127  Unsurprisingly, these safe bets 
yielding higher returns attracted more and more investors, who 
demanded more and more securities, which in turn grew demand for 
secondary market mortgages.  This increased lender motivation for 
volume, which made underwriting seem less and less essential as time 
went on.  
The implicit and cost-free federal guaranty of GSE securities both 
buoyed investor valuation of such securities and created a moral 
hazard for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac directors.  Because of 
government implicit (and later explicit) underwriting of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, the losses accruing to those pools of securitized 
debt are socialized (ultimately paid for by taxpayers), while the 
profits are privatized.128  Incidentally, an explicit federal guaranty also 
underwrites commercial banks:  federal deposit insurance prevents 
banks from “going under,” thus spreading the risks and costs of bank 
failures over the entire public.129  The Wall Street bailout has been 
criticized for extending this same system retroactively, on a huge 
scale, to failed investment banks.130  Socializing losses while privatizing 
                                                          
 125. See Porter Stansberry, How AIG’s Collapse Began a Global Run on the Banks, 
DAILY WEALTH (Oct. 4, 2008), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/2097802/posts. 
 126. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Boyack, supra note 68 at n. 223-33 and accompanying text. 
 128. Paul Krugman, Krugman:  Fannie and Freddie, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, (July 14, 
2008), http://www.iht.com/bin/ printfriendly.php?id=14480831; see also Bill Mann et 
al., The People Responsible for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, THEMOTLEYFOOL.COM (Sept. 
10, 2008) [hereinafter Fannie/Freddie Motley Fool Article], 
http://www.fool.com/investing/dividends-income/2008/09/10/the-people-
responsible-for-fannie-mae-and-freddie-.aspx. 
 129. See Van Order, supra note 20. 
 130. See Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, Don’t Buy the Chirpy Forecasts, 
NEWSWEEK.COM (Mar. 21, 2009), 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/190340/output/print; see also Ben Rooney, Bank 
failure tally passes 100 for the year, CNNMONEY.COM, (July 23, 2010, 6:55 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/23/news/economy/bank_failures/index.htm.  
Deeming banks “too big to fail” (TBTF) has been “ubiquitous” during this financial 
crisis, drawing much criticism.  The ultimate result was that, in terms of government 
guaranty and moral hazard, “virtually all major financial institutions (banks 
included) and systems of institutions are GSEs” in effect.  Hanweck et al., supra note 
58, at 1. 
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profits encourages lender risk-taking.131  This moral hazard is implicit 
in governmental guaranties and underwriting, whether this 
underwriting results from federal conservatorship, government 
insurance, or direct bailout of entities deemed “too big to fail.”  In 
each case, risks borne by such entities are subsidized by tax dollars.  A 
taxpayer risk subsidy undercuts the raison d’être for the GSEs in the 
first place:  to increase market liquidity to encourage capital to flow 
to under-served borrowers.  Instead of public support paying for a 
public good (increased market liquidity), taxpayer funds ended up 
being allocated to prop up individual market players.   
Supposedly, systemic disincentives created by taxpayer-funded 
guaranties can be corrected through regulation, and thus 
government prudential regulation would theoretically limit risk-
taking.132  Yet, loan purchase criteria and other regulatory restraints 
ultimately failed to insulate the GSEs from inordinate risk.  Faced 
with the pressures and temptations to expand mortgage purchases, 
and poised in the context of a bloated mortgage market, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac ended up taking on far more risk than their meager 
capital reserves could ever hope to absorb.133   
3. Relative and Absolute Size 
The losses incurred by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—now 
estimated at $220 billion—were massive, far beyond anyone’s 
previously anticipated “worst case scenario.”134  These losses were 
surprisingly large not just because of the GSEs’ bad timing and moral 
hazard.  The sheer size of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s market 
share increased their general vulnerability to economic downturns.135  
                                                          
 131. See Krugman, supra note 128. 
 132. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 115 (discussing the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight and other regulatory efforts with respect to the GSEs). 
 133. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s government regulator, the OFHEO was 
essentially “fired” by the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, 
Division A of The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Public Law 110-289, 
which set up a new federal oversight agency for the GSEs, the FHFA.  See DiVenti, 
supra note 90, at 231-232. 
 134. GSE losses have been calculated at $226 billion, about 3/4 from Alt-A loans 
and less than 10% from subprime mortgage backed securities purchased by the 
GSEs.  Conservator Report, supra note 92.  By 2007, the GSEs owned $170 billion of 
subprime mortgages in AAA tranches of private label securities (11% of total 
outstanding subprime debt).  James B. Lockhardt III, “GSE Challenges:  Reform and 
Regulatory Oversight,” Speech at MBA’s National Secondary Market Conference and Expo, 
May 21, 2007, available at www.mortgagebankers.org/files/CREF/docs/ 
2007/Regulatoryand LegislativeRoundup-JamesB.LockhartIII.pdf. 
 135. When Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were put into conservatorship in 
September 2008, they had $5.4 trillion of guarantied mortgage backed securities 
debt between them.  See Statement of Federal Housing Finance Agency Director James B. 
Lockhardt III, Sept. 7, 2008, available at 
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Because the GSEs had assumed the credit risk with respect to an 
enormous percentage of home mortgage loans, when mortgage 
defaults increased and home values fell, the GSEs felt the drop in the 
market more any other player.136  In relative terms, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac were among the most exposed of financial housing 
market actors.  In absolute terms, their losses were staggering:  to 
repay taxpayer monies already funneled to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac, the companies would have to jointly pay the government over 
$360 million dollars every month for the next thirty years (and that 
without any interest or inflation rate included).137 
4. Inadequate Loss Buffers 
The housing market that rewarded risky, high-volume lending and 
disincentivized prudent underwriting also operated in the absence of 
adequate “buffers” or safeguards against issuer meltdowns.  When 
defaults and devaluations outpaced projections, insurance and capital 
reserves proved completely inadequate.  Commercial banks are 
required by bank regulations to retain a certain amount of capital in 
reserve as a cushion against losses or unforeseen demands to release 
deposits.138  Prior to the financial crisis, Basel II regulated these levels, 
and the regime for capital reserve regulation (and other banking 
regulation aspects) has recently been changed (some would say 
upgraded) under Basel III.139  Essentially, the concept of capital 
reserves is the same under both regimes:  the riskier the loans that a 
financial institution makes, the larger reserve cushion of capital the 
bank must keep.  Because financial institutions use money to make 
money, they lose potential profits for any reserve capital that cannot 
be used to generate profits.  But operating without sufficient reserves 
                                                          
 http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23/FHFAStatement9708final.pdf.  These GSEs were 
by far the largest secondary mortgage market player, holding more loans than all 
other secondary market players put together.  They were definitely too big to fail.  See 
also Krugman, supra note 128. 
 136. Although the investors in mortgage backed securities had successfully spread 
their risk across multiple loans, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as holders of the 
aggregate risks of default, ended up with all of their eggs in one basket.  If mortgage 
loans are valued based on faulty assumptions (about market values, rates of 
repayment/default), then even a little drop could mean a huge decrease in profits 
for an aggregate credit risk holder. 
 137. There are 360 monthly payments in 30 years, and $130 billion divided by 360 
is $361,111,111.  
 138. Peter Miu, Bogie Ozdemir & Michael Giesinger, Can Basel III Work?  
Examining the New Capital Stability Rules by the Basel Committee–A Theoretical and 
Empirical Study of Capital Buffers (Feb. 2010), available at 
 http://ssrn.com/abstract=1556446. 
 139. Id.  For a discussion of Basel II’s capital requirements, see Eric Y. Wu, Basel II:  
A Revised Framework, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 150 (2005). 
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puts depositors and the institution at risk.140  The concept of reserves 
as protection against unforeseen capital demands is common among 
all financial market participants:  originating lenders, secondary 
market buyers, guarantors and MBS issuers, and anyone who expects, 
but cannot guaranty, a certain flow in/flow out of capital.  Each of 
these parties were constrained by capital reserves and motivated by 
faulty risk-assessments to keep less money back “for a rainy day.”141 
Companies like AIG and Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Company 
(MGIC or “Magic”) recognized that financial institutions wanted to 
free up capital reserves and offered a solution.  These insurers 
offered to pay for an institution’s unforeseen capital needs by selling 
products such as “credit default swaps” to banks around the world.142  
Credit default swaps, which were essentially unregulated insurance 
contracts, freed up more of an institution’s funds to be used to 
generate profits and allowed banks to use greater leverage in 
investing in the secondary market and to get around the Basel 
rules.143  Ironically, these insurers lacked their own reserves and assets 
                                                          
 140. United States banks are further protected from over-extension by FDIC 
insurance over deposits.  See Deposit Insurance, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/ 
(last visited April 26, 2011) (discussing the FDIC insurance system).  
 141. See generally Hanweck et al., supra note 58 (comparing the moral hazard of 
FDIC insurance to that of the implicit government guaranty of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac investor obligations). 
 142. In this way, the mortgage-backed securities had been moved off balance 
sheet.  If they were held on balance sheet, Basel II banking regulations required the 
institution to hold 8% cash reserves to support the risk represented by the securities.  
But by building conduits, the securitizers were able to give just a credit line (0.8%) 
reserve.  Once the securities were moved back on the balance sheet, the institutions 
were immediately and desperately in need of capital.  See Stansberry, supra note 125. 
 143. An example helps to illustrate how credit default swaps worked:  There is a 
hypothetical European bank (“EB”) that has surplus deposits and wants to maximize 
the spread between what it must pay for deposits and what it can earn from making 
loans.  EB would like to find reliable investments that would allow its capital to earn 
the best returns.  One option would be to buy a pool of high-yielding (but high-risk) 
subprime mortgages, but under Basel II, EB would have to keep a significant capital 
reserve to support such a risky investment.  AIG would offer to insure the subprime 
securitization investment for BE.  AIG would use statistical analysis of anticipated 
values, default rate and other risk factors to calculate the anticipated rate of return 
on the securities and insure the securities against this risk for some percentage of the 
securities’ face value.  Although called a “credit default swap,” this was really an 
unregulated insurance contract.  AIG would be paid a lump sum in return for 
guarantying the securities, and AIG’s own AAA rating would deem the insured 
securities safe, requiring a much lower Basel II capital cushion. EB could put more of 
its capital into the market to make higher profits under this arrangement.  
Furthermore, due to mark-to-market accounting, AIG would immediately book the 
profit on the credit default swap based on the payment received, discounted by the 
expected default rate.  The credit default swap was a win-win for the insurer and the 
holder of the swap:  EB would get a guaranteed return on a risky investment, 
allowing it a higher profit with lower reserves, and AIG could immediately book 
profits from the swap.  Of course, once AIG’s rating fell and its own lack of assets 
meant it could not make good on its swap promises, the risk holdings of banks 
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to back up their promised payouts.  When it became apparent that 
AIG and other insurers lacked the capital to back up the insurance 
they sold, and when the profits these companies had booked never 
actually materialized, the insurers failed.  This resulted in the 
undercapitalization of the financial institutions (aka the financial 
crisis of 2008).144  The massive amounts of capital “created” through 
these types of market innovations ended up disappearing in the face 
of greater-than-anticipated defaults and falling collateral values.  The 
over-leveraged deposits of financial institutions were insufficient to 
support their actual market risks, and only the 2008 government 
bailouts prevented the complete meltdown of the world’s financial 
system.145 
                                                          
increased, leaving them in violation of Basel II and unable to support their own 
capital needs. 
 144. On September 15, 2008, all major credit agencies downgraded AIG, leading 
to soaring losses in the financial sector.  Once AIG was downgraded, it suddenly had 
to come up with billions of dollars of reserve funds that it did not have, leaving the 
world’s largest insurance company effectively bankrupt.  AIG’s failure started a 
frightening domino effect:  Lehman Brothers failed on the same day, and Merrill 
Lynch was sold to Bank of America.  Although the federal government stepped in, 
promising to lend AIG $85 billion and to facilitate an “orderly” sell-off of assets, the 
fractured system was too far gone to completely save.  AIG’s largest trading partner 
was Goldman Sachs, and when AIG went bankrupt, Goldman lost $20 billion.  
Although Goldman was able to recoup half these losses by offering shares to Warren 
Buffett ($5 billion) and the public ($5 billion), it still experienced a massive capital 
drain from AIG’s failure.  The collapse of the credit default swap market led to a 
liquidity freeze for the investment banks.  Without viable insurance for bank 
obligations, no additional capital could be released:  all available capital had to be 
used to fund required reserves.  Even daily operation costs had to be funded by the 
Federal Reserve through bailout funds.   
 145. The federal government provided $348 billion to financial institutions in just 
one month in 2008.  Stansberry, supra note 125.  Much of this money has since been 
repaid.  Jeff Bater & John Kell, With Fifth Third Out, Banks Have Repaid 99% of TARP, 
THE WALL ST. J., March 17, 2011; see also Zachary Kouwe, As Banks Repay Bailout 
Money, U.S. Sees a Profit, THE N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009.  The U.S. government had no 
choice but to fund a bailout of AIG and the financial institutions.  For example, Sen. 
Chris Dodd described meeting with U.S. Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke and others in Congress as the government decided whether 
to provide bailout funds to AIG and Wall Street, “The Federal Reserve Chairman 
announced that unless we acted within a matter of days, the entire financial system in 
the entire world could meltdown.”  Chris Dodd Offers Glimpse into Financial Reform Bill, 
THE GW HATCHET (Jan. 14, 2011), available at 
http://blogs.gwhatchet.com/newsroom/2011/01/14/chris-dodd-offers-glimpse-into-
financial-reform-bill; see also Jamie L. Freedman, Examining Financial Reform, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/newsstories/Pages/ExaminingFinancialReform.aspx  
Financial expert and talking head Suze Orman put it succinctly, “Thank God, they 
bailed out AIG.”  Suze Orman, Thank God, They Bailed Out AIG, CNN LIVING (Sept. 
17, 2008), http://articles.cnn.com/2008-09-17/living/lkl.suze.orman_1_aig-bailout-
suze-orman-stock-markets?_s=PM:LIVING.  A half year after the bailout, some 
questioned whether it had, in fact, been as necessary as it had seemed at the time. 
 See, e.g., Did We Need to Bail Out AIG?, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2009/04/did_we_need_to_bail_o
ut_aig. 
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The people quantifying the risks posed by mortgages and 
securitization of mortgages did not accurately estimate the risks, in 
part because they were limited by their own historical lack of 
experience.  The generation of analysts that were operating on Wall 
Street and in the GSEs in the first decade of the twenty-first century 
simply had no personal knowledge of a time when real estate values 
significantly declined and mortgage default was common.146  Their 
models and their experience failed to recognize any possibility that 
there would be significant credit failures or significant collateral 
failures when in fact, there were both.147  Mortgage defaults have 
increased so rapidly that in 2010, lenders commenced as many 
foreclosures in a month as they previously had in a year,148 and home 
values have fallen across the country by 30% since 2006.149  In some 
markets, home devaluation has been vastly greater.150  Falling home 
values led to more mortgage defaults—directly through valuation 
motivated (“strategic”) defaults, and indirectly by increased levels of 
unemployment due to decreased housing and finance demand, 
leading to greater inability to make mortgage payments.151   
The GSEs were unprepared to absorb losses of this magnitude.  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s lax capital reserve requirements made 
their position even more precarious.  Notwithstanding some earlier 
legislative efforts to consider increasing the GSEs’ cash reserve, their 
capital reserve requirements in 2008 remained a mere 2.5%.152  In a 
2003 House Financial Services Committee Hearing, for example, 
Representative Barney Frank expressed the prevailing policy choice 
to free up more capital to encourage market liquidity.  In the debate 
about whether the GSEs’ capital reserve requirements should be 
beefed up, Frank infamously said, “I do not want the same kind of 
focus on safety and soundness that we have in OCC [Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency] and OTS [Office of Thrift 
Supervision].  I want to roll the dice a little bit more in this 
situation.”153  Today, this statement is both ironic and telling:  
                                                          
 146. Thompson, supra note 11, at 52. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra note 2.  Each month, approximately 100,000 homes nationwide are 
lost in a foreclosure sale, a rate comparable to the number of homes lost in 
foreclosure in an entire year pre-crisis.  Viega, supra note 2.   
 149. See supra note 3. 
 150. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13, at 380-82. 
 151. Gail Marks-Jarvis, Ethics of Strategic Default are Really Hitting Home, CHICAGO 
TRIB., Oct. 7, 2010. (“Morgan Stanley recently estimated that about 18 percent of 
defaults will be strategic.”). 
 152. Frame & White, supra note 55, at 170.  
 153. See Opinion, What They Said About Fran and Fred, THE WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, 
at A19, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122290574391296381.html. 
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Congress made a conscious policy choice to take on more 
governmental risk in order to promote broader home ownership.154  
Congress was telling Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to take risks, to 
spend more capital to help originate still more mortgages, and to 
promote homeownership and home borrowing.155  Thus, the capital 
reserve cushion for the GSEs remained 2.5% of the value of 
securitized loans, and by 2008 it was clear that this amount was 
woefully inadequate.156   
In July 2008, the U.S. Treasury indicated that the government 
would bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac if necessary.157  By 
September 2008, it was.  The Treasury Department placed Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, reorganizing the 
enterprises and infusing them with new capital.158  The Treasury 
Department pledged to guaranty the GSEs’ debts, bring in new 
                                                          
According to investment website MotleyFool.com, Frank may have been under a 
chronic misapprehension regarding the true nature of the GSE’s risk portfolio.  Less 
than a month before Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac went into conservatorship, on 
Aug. 25, 2008, Frank told Money magazine that “Fannie and Freddie are better off 
than the market thinks . . . .  Part of the problem is rumor-mongering by short-
sellers.”  See Mann et al., supra note 128. 
 154. Sen. John Sunnunu explained that part of the housing boom was caused by a 
political problem since no one wanted to appear to be anti-housing.  Financial Fiasco:  
The U.S. Infatuation with Homeownership, CATO INST. (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=6419. 
 155. Comments such as Representative Frank’s, see supra note 153, suggest that 
some in Congress may have confused the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with 
that of the FHA.  FHA provides subsidies in the form of rental or mortgage 
borrowing assistance—providing publicly funded support for lower income housing.  
The GSEs were designed to be budget neutral, providing merely a mechanism to 
assist private capital flow to support middle-income home borrowing and rental 
projects.  The GSEs’ goals of market promotion and liquidity generation were not 
intended to be direct government subsidies of housing, but rather a policy that 
would keep homeownership (and renting) affordable to middle-class Americans. 
 156. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 116 (discussing failed efforts by Gary 
Gensler, current Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and 
then undersecretary of the Treasury, to rein in the GSEs in March 2000 and the 
policies underlying the expansion of the GSEs during the following eight years).  In 
1996, the Congressional Budget Office reported that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
were likely using government support to increase their profits rather than reduce 
mortgage rates, but concluded that it was impossible to control this abuse of 
government support.  The Congressional Budget Office’s report concluded with a 
surprisingly folksy idiom:  “Once one agrees to share a canoe with a bear, it is hard to 
get him out without obtaining his agreement or getting wet.”  Id.  
 157. Ellis, supra note 70; see also Krugman, supra note 128. 
 158. Ellis, supra note 70; see James Lockhardt Statement, supra note 72; see also 
Press Release, United States Department of Treasury, Fact Sheet, Questions and 
Answers on Conservatorship, (Sept. 7, 2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/fhfa_consrv_faq_090708hp1128.pdf; Testimony of Herbert 
Allison, supra note 73.  For information on GSE investigations conducted during 
conservatorship activities, see News Release, Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA 
Issues Subpoenas for PLS Documents (July 12, 2010), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15935/PLS_subpoena_final_7_12_10.pdf.   
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management, and provide fresh liquidity to the declining housing 
market.  At the time, this was the largest state rescue in history:  $200 
billion.159  The amount of federal funds earmarked to back up GSE 
securities was increased to $400 billion and then pledged without 
limit.160  To date, well over $130 billion of taxpayer money has been 
paid on behalf of the GSEs, and the pledge of federal support could 
very well be billions more.161  This means that the GSE 
conservatorship will likely end up being the largest single piece of the 
financial crisis bailout.  
Rescuing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 was necessary to 
keep the residential mortgage market machinery from grinding to a 
halt and to mitigate the impact of the crash on homeowners and 
homebuyers.162  By allowing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to continue 
providing market liquidity, would-be buyers could continue to get 
mortgage loans, which permitted some degree of market normalcy.163  
In addition, without credit availability for housing finance, even more 
defaulted mortgages would remain in economic limbo, either as 
foreclosure pending or post-foreclosure sale real estate owned by the 
lending banks (REO properties).  Today, 90% of mortgage loans are 
originated either with FHA insurance supporting credit risk or 
                                                          
 159. The initial 2008 Wall Street bailout plan announced just weeks later was 
much larger—$700 billion.  Some later estimates suggest that the true cost of the 
private label bailout may be hundreds of billions more.  See Deborah Solomon et al., 
New Bank Bailout Could Cost $2 Trillion, THE WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123319689681827391.html.  When the dust finally 
settles, however, the Fannie/Freddie bailout may well end up costing the taxpayers 
far in excess of the original estimate and the Wall Street bailout funds may be more 
likely to be reimbursed.  Bloomberg Business Week recently speculated that, “[t]he 
cost of fixing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage companies that last year 
bought or guaranteed three-quarters of all U.S. home loans, will be at least $160 
billion and could grow to as much as $1 trillion.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, now 
80% owned by U.S. taxpayers, already have drawn $145 billion from the currently-
unlimited line of government credit granted to ensure that home buyers can get 
loans while the private housing-finance industry is moribund.  That surpasses the 
amount spent on rescues of American International Group Inc., General Motors Co. 
or Citigroup Inc., which have begun repaying their debts.”  Lorraine Woellert & John 
Gittelsohn, Fannie-Freddie Fix at $160 Billion With $1 Trillion Worst Case, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (June 14, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-
14/fannie-freddie-fix-at-160-billion-with-1-trillion-worst-case.html.  Other estimates of 
the cost expended to maintain the GSEs thus far put the figure around $130-135 
billion.  Applebaum, supra note 12; Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16. 
 160. Corbett Daly, Treasury Uncaps Credit Line for Fannie, Freddie, REUTERS, Dec. 24, 
2009.  
 161. See supra note 7.   
 162. See Testimony of Herbert Allison, supra note 73; see also Van Order, supra note 
88 (“That is the paradox of guarantees.  They produce incentives to take on too 
much risk, as they did with Fannie and Freddie after 2004 and with the savings and 
loans in the 1980s, but they also limit systemic risk and panic.  It’s hard to have one 
without the other.”). 
 163. See Treasury/HUD Report, supra 16; Van Order, supra note 20. 
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originated specifically for GSE resale,164 and the only positive 
mortgage cash flows are in the realm of GSE purchases.165   
Most if not all of the “bailout” monies allocated to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac have been used to cover the bad vintage loans from 
2006 and 2007 (particularly the Alt-A loans).166  After decades of 
superlative market performance, two abysmal years of secondary 
market purchases coupled with lack of capital reserves crippled these 
housing finance giants.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain on 
government life support.  Now, politicians and taxpayers alike cry for 
their total eradication.167 
II. REFORMING AMERICA’S HOUSING MARKET:   
A REPORT TO CONGRESS 
Almost immediately after billions of dollars were earmarked to save 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008, proposals began proliferating 
recommending GSE reform or elimination.  In October 2009, Credit 
Suisse produced a research analysis report titled “GSEs—Still the Best 
Answer for Housing Finance.”168  The paper stresses the need to 
preserve Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in order to save the fragile 
residential mortgage market from further disruption, to preserve the 
market’s ability to guaranty mortgage capital costs prior to loan 
origination (known as the “TBA market”), and to take advantage of 
the structures already in place at the GSEs, including human capital, 
technology and infrastructure.169  Credit Suisse proposed that the 
current GSEs be segued into issuers with a “clean slate” by 
transferring non-performing portfolio assets and high credit risk 
guaranties to a “bad bank” to hold while retaining healthy assets and 
guaranties in a “good bank” supported by explicit government 
reinsurance.170   
                                                          
 164. See infra notes 218-220 and accompanying text; A Responsible Market for 
Housing Finance:  A Progressive Plan to Reform to Reform the U.S. Secondary Market for 
Residential Mortgages, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter Secondary 
Market Report], http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
 2011/01/pdf/responsiblemarketforhousingfinance.pdf. 
 165. See Jim Clayton, P&Ls:  Pricing, Liquidity and Leverage, PREA QUARTERLY 46-52 
(Winter 2009).   
 166. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16 at 23; Conservator Report, supra note 
92.  
 167. See supra note 9.   
 168. Qumber Hassan & Mahesh Swaminathan, Mortgage Market Comment, GSEs—
Still the Best Answer for Housing Finance, Credit Suisse,  CREDIT SUISSE (Oct. 6, 2009), 
available at http://www.zigasassociates.com/images/uploads/GSEs_-
_Still_the_best_answer_for_housing_finance.pdf 
 169. Id. at 1-3 
 170. Id. at 1; see also Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., Improving U.S. Housing Finance 
through Reform of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:  Assessing the Options, FURMAN CTR. FOR 
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The Center for American Progress (CAP) produced a proposal 
recommending that the government offer an explicit guaranty of 
regulated mortgage-backed securities issued by various entities.171  
The proposal outlines a structure where several “charter mortgage 
issuers” would issue government guaranteed mortgage backed 
securities, backed by mortgages on both single and multifamily 
housing.172  The CAP proposal claims to promote market liquidity 
through supporting mortgage-backed securitization and to ensure 
market stability through comprehensive regulation.  Further, the 
CAP proposal would support fair housing by requiring that all 
guarantied issuers ensure capital flows to underserved 
communities.173  CAP also issued an October 2010 paper focusing on 
the critical need to preserve funding for multifamily mortgages.174 
The Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) issued a report in 
August 2009 proposing the creation of new, privately-owned, and 
chartered mortgage credit-guarantor entities that would be covered 
with an explicit government guaranty and would step into the 
liquidity-promoting role formerly occupied by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.175  Under the MBA proposal, the government guaranty 
would only apply to securities of pools of qualified loans, not 
portfolio losses or corporate debt in general, with profits of the 
issuing entities set at a modest level like that of a public utility.176  To 
protect against moral hazard, a strong prudential regulator would 
ensure compliance with underwriting criteria, pricing of securities, 
and adequacy of capital reserves.177  A similar “good bank/bad bank 
                                                          
REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL’Y, 30–31 (2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001382-fannie-mae-freddie-mac-reform.pdf.  
 171. A Responsible Market for Housing Finance:  A Progressive Plan to Reform the U.S. 




 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 30-33; see also Ellen et al., supra note 170 at 28-30. 
 174. A Responsible Market for Rental Housing Finance:  Envisioning the Future of the U.S. 
Secondary Market for Multifamily Residential Rental Mortgages, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(2010), available at 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/10/pdf/multifamilyhousingreport.p
df. 
 175. Recommendations for the Future Government Role in the Core Secondary Mortgage 
Market, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Advocacy/2009/RecommendationsfortheFu
tureGovernmentRole.pdf. 
 176. Id.; see also Ellen et al., supra note 170, at 32-34. 
 177. Recommendations for the Future Government Role in the Core Secondary Mortgage 
Market, MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Advocacy/2009/RecommendationsfortheFu
tureGovernmentRole.pdf. 
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resolution of the GSEs” would aid in transitioning the current system 
to the one the MBA proposes.178  After the Obama Administration 
issued its February 2011 proposal, the MBA issued a press release 
claiming that their proposal had been included as one of the three 
options outlined by the administration.179 
The Housing Policy Council has also been involved in the debates 
and planning surrounding the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  In July 2010, it issued a proposal advocating an explicit 
government guaranty for mortgage-backed securities meeting 
enumerated underwriting criteria.180  The proposal by the Financial 
Services Roundtable suggested supporting successor secondary 
market mortgage backed issuers with privately capitalized and 
regulated insurance companies, subject to underwriting regulation, 
but not supported by any governmental guaranty.  The government 
would provide backup insurance over issued securities (at a cost 
charged to the issuers) in case the private insurance system should 
fail.181  In the Obama Administration’s February 2011 press release, 
the Financial Services Roundtable endorsed the third option 
(“Privatized system of housing finance with . . . catastrophic 
reinsurance behind significant private capital”).182   
This flurry of debate and political demands for a plan for the GSEs’ 
future in the wake of the conspicuous absence of any guidance on the 
issue in the Dodd-Frank Act eventually led to the Obama 
Administration’s own proposal, a report to Congress titled 
“Reforming America’s Housing Finance Market” (the 
“Treasury/HUD Report” or “Report”), in February 2011.183  The 
                                                          
 178. Id. 
 179. Press Release, Michael D. Berman, Chairman, Mortgage Bankers Association, 
MBA’s Comment on Administration’s White Paper on Government Role in the 
Secondary Mortgage Market (Feb. 11, 2011), available at 
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/75650.htm (“We are 
gratified to see that one of the concepts they articulate closely tracks MBA’s proposal, 
released eighteen months ago . . . .  Our proposal directly addresses the problems 
that caused the failure of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac system.”). 
 180. Letter from Housing Policy Council, The Financial Services Roundtable, to 
Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary, and Shaun Donovan, HUD Secretary 5 (July 
21, 2010), available at 
http://www.fsround.org/housing/pdfs/pdfs2010/HousingPolicyCouncilComments
onReformofHousingFinanceSystem7-21-10.pdf. 
 181. Id.; see also Ellen et al., supra note 170, at 34-35. 
 182. Press Release, Housing Policy Council, The Financial Services Roundtable, 
Housing Policy Council Statement on Administration’s Proposal for GSE Reform 
(Feb. 11, 2011) (quoting Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 29), available at 
www.fsround.org/media/htm11/HPC_statement_on_admin_proposal_for_GSE_Ref
orm.html. 
 183. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 1-3 (discussing the government’s 
proposed role as providing oversight and limited, targeted assistance). 
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Treasury/HUD Report cited several “fundamental structural flaws” in 
the GSEs that led to their failure.184  The Report blames the profit 
motive inherent in a privately capitalized structure, saying it 
“undermined the[] public mission” of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(i.e., promoting market stability and access to credit) by encouraging 
excessive risk-taking in seeking excessive returns.185  Such risk-taking 
was not tempered by proper risk assessment because of the 
“perceived government backing” that gave the GSEs an unfair market 
advantage.186  In particular, the Report says the preferential tax 
treatment of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, their low capital reserve 
requirements, and their implicit (and unpaid-for) government 
guaranty allowed the GSEs to price their securities lower and to 
dominate the market, as well as take on “irresponsible risks.”187  In 
addition to the profit motive/risk avoidance tendencies enabled by 
the structure of the GSEs, the Report notes that the capitalization 
requirements for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac proved woefully 
inadequate and that their regulating entity (the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight) was “structurally weak and 
ineffective.”188 
Recognizing the obvious failures of the GSEs, the Report explained 
that significant systemic reform is needed to achieve two policy goals  
maintaining good housing choices while dramatically reducing the 
role of government in the housing market.189  The Report explains 
that although access to credit to buy a home and maintenance of 
quality rental options is essential for quality of life (and the ability to 
“achieve the American Dream”), the housing finance market should 
become “predominantly private.”190 
In a logical non sequitur, however, the report goes on to argue that 
the only way to achieve these outcomes is to “dramatically transform 
the role of government in the housing market” and to wind down the 
GSEs.191  In this way, the Treasury/HUD Report provides a 
frightening example of when good intentions improperly 
                                                          
 184. Id. at 7-9. 
 185. Id. at 8. 
 186. Id.  
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 8-9.  The OFHEO has since been replaced with the FHFA .  Whether or 
not this change in regulatory authority amounts to more than “changing the sign on 
the door” remains to be seen. 
 189. Id. at 12, 18-19. 
 190. Id. at 1-2. 
 191. See id. at 1-2, 12-13 (noting that the Report still advocates for a large role for 
government by providing oversight, protection, and strategic support while also 
apparently advocating for a decrease in government’s traditional role of providing 
incentives to buyers).  
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implemented could have unforeseen, and possibly disastrous, 
consequences.  While the goals of the Report are laudable, 
eliminating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would not effectively 
achieve the housing finance system envisioned by the Report. 
A. The Good:  Necessary Reforms 
Reforms of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are vital, as their 
spectacular failure proves.  The Treasury/HUD Report references 
some of the in-progress changes to underwriting that must be 
implemented in order to restore the soundness of the originated, 
purchased, and pooled mortgages,192 an effort that started with the 
Dodd-Frank Act and impacted the mortgage finance market 
generally,193 rather than simply those loans bought and guarantied by 
the GSEs.  In addition to these ongoing efforts, the Report advocates 
steps to promote GSE independence from taxpayer risk-coverage.194  
Such changes to the GSEs’ mortgage guaranties would foster greater 
market competition and less systemic risk.195  Finally, the report 
mentions, but does not detail, the crucial immediate need for 
coordination among government and other regulated underwriting 
standards in order to resuscitate the wounded housing finance 
market.196 
The critical first step for restoring a well-functioning financing 
system, including originated mortgages and secondary market 
investments in mortgage backed securities, is to improve 
underwriting standards.  Poor underwriting of mortgages, including 
huge loan-to-value ratios and inadequate (or non-existent) credit 
assessments for borrowers, has been widely cited as a major cause of 
the increase in mortgage default and foreclosures.197  The Dodd-
                                                          
 192. See id. at 5, 7, 15-16 (discussing government initiatives currently being 
implemented). 
 193. The Dodd-Frank Act mandated that new underwriting standards be set by the 
government for “qualifying residential mortgages” (QRMs).  Efforts to define and 
implement such enumerated standards are underway.  See infra note 198.  The rules 
for QRMs will be finalized in 2011 and be implemented in 2012. Treasury/HUD 
Report, supra note 16, at 16. 
 194. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 12-13.   
 195. Id. at 15-16. 
 196. Id. at 15. 
 197. See, e.g., Boyack, supra note 68; State of the U.S. Economy and Implications for the 
Federal Budget:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 10 (2007); Oren 
Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1073, 1074 (2009).  In August 2006, Steven Krystofiak, president of the 
Mortgage Brokers Association for Responsible Lending, in a statement at a Federal 
Reserve hearing on mortgage regulation, reported that his organization had 
compared a sample of 100 stated income mortgage applications to IRS records, and 
found almost 60% of the sampled loans had overstated their income by more than 50 
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Frank Act anticipated underwriting improvements as a cornerstone of 
any systemic fix, and set out parameters whereby new underwriting 
standards for “Qualified Residential Mortgages” and “Qualified 
Mortgages” would be promulgated in 2011 and become effective in 
2012.198  The GSEs have recently announced a decrease in loan-to-
value ratio requirements for loans they will purchase.  During the 
housing crisis, the GSEs announced that a mortgage with a 97% loan-
to-value ratio would be eligible for sale to Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac. 199  The Treasury/HUD report mirrors other current proposals 
                                                          
percent.  Mark Gimein, Inside the Liar Loan:  How the Mortgage Industry Nurtured Deceit, 
SLATE (Apr. 24, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/2189576 (quoting Statement of Steven 
Krystofiak, Aug. 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-
1253_3_1.pdf); see also Yulia Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. (2009); Alan M. White, Reboot an Absurd 
System, THE N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2011 (“The absurdity of the pre-crisis home finance 
system was that the most marginal borrowers, first-time buyers, immigrants, young 
people with minimal savings, were likely to get funding through the 
nongovernmental subprime securitization channel, while the government-sponsored 
enterprises funded the middle class and well-heeled.”).  
 198. See Pub. L. 111-203, § 1400 et seq.  The 2,000+ page text of the Dodd-Frank 
Act is available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/ and http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.4173.  It is widely predicted that the new QRM rule will 
make mortgage capital more expensive and less accessible to borrowers.  See, e.g., 
Tamara Keith, Mortgage Rule Raises Doubts for Banks, Borrowers, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 
(Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/29/134960865/FDIC-Unveils-New-
Mortgage-Rules; Dina ElBoghdady & Zachary Goldfarb, Making a Mountain Out of a 
Mortgage?, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2011, at A1; Twenty Percent Downpayment Rule 
Would Disrupt First-Time Home Buyer Market, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders (Mar. 29, 
2011) [hereinafter NAHB QRM Response], www.nahb.org/news_details.aspx? 
sectionID=148&newsID=12402&print=true.  
 199. Down payment requirements have now increased for GSE-purchased 
mortgages. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Announcement SEL-2010-13.  In March 2011, the 
Federal Reserve announced that a 20% down payment would be required for 
qualified residential mortgages.  Federal Reserve Press Release, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110329a.htm.  
The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) and the National Association of 
Realtors (NAR), among others, have decried a 20% down payment requirement as 
unduly restrictive of homeownership.  See NAHB April Statement, supra note 10 (“By 
mandating a 20% downpayment on qualified residential mortgages, the 
Administration and federal regulators are excluding those without huge cash 
reserves—which constitutes most first—time home buyers and many middle-class 
households—from a chance to buy a home,” said NAHB Chairman Bob Nielsen); 
NAR Statement of March 20, 2011, available at http://www.realtor.org/press_room/ 
news_releases/2011/03/downpayment.  NAR President Ron Phipps opined that “[a] 
narrow definition of QRM, with an unnecessarily high down payment requirement, 
will increase the cost and reduce the availability of mortgage credit, significantly 
delaying a housing recovery.  Id.  Although generally available low-equity loan 
options have expired, Fannie Mae has a new “HomePath Mortgage” program that 
provides up to 97% financing without mortgage insurance for designated homes 
owned by Fannie Mae as a result of foreclosure.  Properties that are available can be 
viewed by at www.homepath.com. 
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for decreasing the loan-to-value ratio in prime mortgages to at least 
90%.200   
Any reform of the secondary market and the GSEs must be built 
upon a foundation of good underwriting in originating mortgage 
loans.  For mortgage lending, underwriting has a dual focus:  viability 
of the borrower and sufficiency of the collateral.  Adequate down 
payment requirements are part of this, but borrower credit 
assessment mandates are even more vital.201  “Credit” has been called 
“man’s confidence in man” and measures a lender’s confidence that 
a borrower will repay a loan.202  The likelihood of borrower 
repayment of a debt is typically measured by factors impacting a 
borrower’s ability to repay (income, other payment obligations) and 
a borrower’s willingness to repay, typically based on historical 
repayments of debts (credit history, quantified as a FICO score).203  
Although lowering the loan-to-value ratio increases a lender’s 
                                                          
 200. The Treasury/HUD Report addresses this indirectly, advocating a larger 
required down payment—of at least 10%—by borrowers as a way to increase the level 
of private capital ahead of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s guarantees.  
Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 13.  The NAHB has consistently decried this 
move as shifting the middle-class away from non-subsidized home affordability.  
Nicholas J. Tennyson responded to an editorial in The Washington Post’s opinion page 
supporting an increased down payment requirement for qualified residential 
mortgages. “You said, ‘It’s probably best to draw the line at those who can make 
downpayments of 20%, and let low- and moderate-income borrowers who can still 
qualify in the private market turn to the Federal Housing Administration.’  Marie 
Antoinette was much more economical in her use of language when she offered the 
same sentiment – ‘let them eat cake.’”  See NAHB April Report, supra note 10. 
 201. Bob Nielsen of the NAHB correctly pointed out that “[l]ow-down payments 
are not what drove this lending crisis.  It was lax underwriting standards.”  NAHB 
April Statement, supra note 10. Government data shows convincingly that the size of 
the down payment, while a factor in predicting mortgage defaults, was much less 
significant a factor than credit history. ElBoghdady & Goldfarb, supra note 198 
(borrowers who met strong credit underwriting standards but made small down 
payments defaulted at a rate of 2.3% while 80% LTV loans without good credit 
underwriting defaulted at a rate of 4.7%).  Not only do lenders hope primarily to 
recover from a borrower rather than seek repayment from foreclosure sales, but 
pursuing collection through foreclosure is costly and uncertain in terms of timing 
and ultimate recovery.  See, e.g., John Y. Campbell et al., Forced Sales and House 
Prices 10 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://econ-
www.mit.edu/files/3914 (showing that foreclosure sales prices averaged 27% lower 
than the appraised value for the home).  The losses incurred by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac due to Alt-A loan default underscore this concept:  the Alt-A loans 
typically had higher-than-average down payments (and consequentially lower loan-to-
value ratios), but because borrower repayment ability had not been confirmed, 
default—and therefore loss—far exceeded expectations. 
 202. Senator Daniel Webster, Address to Congress Regarding Bank of United 
States Charter (May 7, 1834); see BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 424 (9th ed. 2009).  
 203. There are three FICO scores for each potential borrower, representing credit 
information kept by the three credit bureaus, Experian, TransUnion, and Equifax.  
About Credit Scores, MYFICO, 
http://www.myfico.com/crediteducation/creditscores.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 
2011); see also MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13 at 367-69. 
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likelihood of ultimately recovering outstanding loan amounts from 
the asset in the event of default, the primary concern of a mortgage 
lender is avoiding default in the first place.  Recovering the borrowed 
funds from loan collateral is merely a contingency plan.204  Although 
the recent increase in strategic defaults of underwater mortgages 
proves the theory that increasing a mortgage’s loan-to-value ratio also 
increases the risk of default,205 it is certainly not the only factor.  Belief 
in ever-increasing real estate values tempted many lenders to increase 
loan-to-value ratios and to ignore other credit fundamentals such as 
verified income and assets—the “ability to repay” piece of the 
underwriting equation.  Abandonment of sound underwriting led to 
vastly increased rates of default.206  Relying on real property values 
alone to ensure profit from mortgages is predictably foolish because 
foreclosures are costly and uncertain and values are unpredictable.207  
A stable mortgage market, therefore, must be founded on credit 
underwriting as well as adequate security. 
The Treasury/HUD report enumerates some baby steps that will 
reduce GSE market share and wean the GSEs off of their current 
government support.208  To some extent, many of these steps are 
necessary, even if the ultimate wind-down of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are not.  For example, the Report advocates increasing the 
                                                          
 204. Strength of collateral values is akin to the strength of the safety net below a 
tightrope walker, while strength of borrower credit—akin to strength of the actual 
rope—is of even greater concern to lenders. 
 205. See Elul, supra note 121; David Streitfeld, No Help in Sight, More Homeowners 
Walk Away, THE N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010. 
 206. CRL Brief, supra note 89 (citing the Alt-A loan failures as “the primary reason 
that the GSEs were placed into conservatorship); see also Fannie Mae Investor 
Presentation, Fannie Mae 2008 Q2 10A Investor Summary, 36, Aug. 6, 2008, available at 
www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/webcast/080808transcript.pdf.  By 2008, Alt-A 
loans accounted for 10% of GSEs’ risk exposure but 50% of their combined loses.  
U.S. SEC Form 10-Q, for Quarterly Period ending June 30, 2008, FED. NAT’L MORTG. ASS’N 
6, available at www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/earnings/2008/q22008.pdf; U.S SEC 
Form 10-Q, for the Quarterly Period ending June 30, 2008, FED. HOME LOAN MORTG. 
CORP. 71, available at www.frediemac.com/investors/.  According to the Calculated 
Risk Blog Data Charts, default rates and foreclosure rates for Alt-A loans exceed all 
other types of non-subprime loans other than Option ARMs (adjustable rate 
mortgages) and are experiencing default at a rate some four times higher than other 
prime loan products.  Calculated Risk, Forex - MBA National Delinquency Survey:  
Delinquency rate declines in Q3, FOREXTV.COM (Nov. 18, 2010, 11:29 AM) [hereinafter 
Calculated Risk Data], http://www.forextv.com/forex-news-story/forex-mba-
national-delinquency-survey-delinquency-rate-declines-in-q3.  
 207. John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House Prices, 
HARV. U. STUDY (Dec. 2009), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/3914.  The 
study showed that foreclosure sales prices averaged 27% lower than the appraised 
value for the home.  Id. 
 208. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 12-13 (listing recommendations to 
increase private capital while reducing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s involvement 
in housing finance). 
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capital reserve requirements of the GSEs and bolstering GSE 
independence through private insurance rather than a government 
guaranty.209  The Report also argues that guaranty fee pricing should 
be increased as well, as a way to attract private capital back to the 
secondary market.210  Artificial increases to guaranty fees will not be 
necessary if the level of government support is decreased and thereby 
the guaranty costs of the GSEs rise—in this case, guaranty fees will 
increase naturally and in the proper proportion to indicate true costs 
and market factors.  Weaning the GSEs from their taxpayer-funded 
guaranties is ultimately a legitimate and wise policy goal, and 
measured steps toward this goal can and should be taken right away. 
The Report also sets forth several short-term steps aimed at 
decreasing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s share of the secondary 
mortgage and mortgage backed securities markets.211  Although these 
steps are justifiable to the extent they promote market efficiencies 
such as competition and consumer options, the resulting reductions 
may hurt rather than help mortgage borrowers and investors if 
reductions in GSE market share are aimed solely at efforts to wind 
down the entities.  Traditionally, GSE mortgage loan purchases 
focused on a limited target:  qualifying mortgages could not be too 
big or too risky.  Risk was controlled through underwriting standards 
and size was controlled through conforming loan limits.212  The 
market limitations placed on the GSEs were motivated by their 
mandates:  providing capital liquidity and homeownership are goals 
specifically targeted at improving ownership potential of middle (and 
lower) income Americans whose unsupported ability to leverage 
home purchases were otherwise limited by the intersection of market 
factors (such as the cost of lending capital) and the reality of limited 
liquidity resources of most working Americans.  This is true today as 
well, and explains why the GSE role remains necessary:  while the 
FHA can focus on taxpayer-funded housing options for the poorest 
citizens and the private market responds well to the needs of the 
wealthiest, liquidity support is necessary to ensure stable, constant 
                                                          
 209. Id. at 13.  
 210. Id. at 28. The FHA immediately raised their mortgage insurance premium by 
a quarter of a percentage point for all of its fifteen and thirty-year loans.  See 
Coleman Wood, The Future of Fannie/Freddie?, S.E. REAL ESTATE BUS. (March 2011), 
http://southeastrebusiness.com/articles/MAR11/cover2.html.  
 211. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 11-15. 
 212. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.  Some size limits have been 
subject to geographical adjustments from time to time to account for widely differing 
locality pricing in housing markets. See Lender Letter LL-2010-13, Nov. 19, 2010, 
available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/ 
2010/ll1013.pdf.   
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access to funding for the huge percentage of middle-income 
Americans.  Therefore, reducing conforming loan limits to their pre-
crisis levels, in terms of dollar-caps on loans, makes sense.  However, 
this concept could be taken too far.  Loan size reduction should not 
be a tool to take the GSEs out of the market altogether, but rather a 
way to scale back GSE-supported lending to a more manageable and 
justifiable market sector. 
The Treasury/HUD Report notes the necessity of “improving 
coordination among existing government housing finance 
programs.”213  Coordination of programs is long overdue and is one 
of the largest impediments to efficient market functioning today.  
Ironically, however, the meltdown in the housing and financial 
markets over the past few years has led to a decrease of cooperation 
and coordination among finance programs.  Although the report 
validly points out that the “programs and borrowers will benefit from 
greater coordination of systems, information, and market 
standards,”214 during the last few years, each agency has been allowed 
to promulgate its own qualification requirements, underwriting 
standards, and processes.  The resulting mish-mash of regulations 
and ever-changing standards has made mortgage lending less 
predictable and, therefore, more costly.215  Although many standards 
are somewhat duplicative across agencies and programs, some 
requirements are irreconcilable.  Some are even so poorly conceived 
that they are internally inconsistent, making predictable satisfaction 
impossible.  This is particularly true with respect to approved 
multifamily and condominium lending under FHA and Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.216 
                                                          
 213. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 13, 15.  
 214. Id.  
 215. See Letter from Loura Sanchez of Hindman Sanchez to Community 
Associations Institute, Nov. 23, 2010 (discussing internally inconsistent regulations 
that make it impossible for condominiums to ensure compliance with GSE and FHA 
approval requirements while not violating FHA’s interpretation of 24 CFR 203.41); 
see also Andrea Boyack, Community Collateral Damage:  A Question of Priorities 
(forthcoming Apr. 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1811067. 
 216. Condominium Approval Process for Single Family Housing, DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV. (2009), available at 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/letters/mortgagee/files/09-46bml.pdf.  
Condominium projects will not be approved for resale to the GSEs (or for FHA 
insurance) unless, inter alia, no more than 15% of the total units are in arrears 
(more than 30 days past due) of their association assessments and at least 50% of the 
units in the project are owner-occupied.  HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-19, June 12, 
2009; HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-46A, Nov. 6, 2009; HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-
46B, Nov. 6, 2009.  The restrictions make it difficult to resell distressed units at a 
market price.  See Lew Sichelman, Lender Overlays Killing Home Sales, NAT’L MORTG. 
NEWS, Nov. 19, 2010 (“[M]any condo units sit empty, not for a lack of demand, but 
for a lack of financing.”). 
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B. The Bad:  Worrisome Long Term Plans 
While the Treasury/HUD Report outlines some short-term plans 
that would undoubtedly lead to market recovery and a more stable 
financing system prospectively, it does so only in the context of the 
long-term goal of “[i]mplementing a wind-down of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s future participation in the housing market.”217  
Although it may make sense to take the U.S. government out of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (by removing the federal guaranty of 
those companies), it makes far less sense to take Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac out of the U.S. housing finance system.  Historically, the 
GSEs have been responsible for many market and lifestyle benefits 
that would be eroded in the absence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
as market players.218  Homeownership, access to mortgage financing, 
lending competition, and rental housing all would be adversely 
impacted by withdrawing the GSEs from the market.219  Enormous 
resources developed over more than 40 years and currently part of 
the GSEs, in terms of human capital, connections, industry know-how 
and data, would be lost or devalued by the wind-down.220  The wind-
down itself would put tremendous pressure on a mortgage finance 
system already in the throes of its worst historic meltdown.221  
Furthermore, getting rid of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is 
unnecessary in order to achieve the very goals that the Report 
supposedly aims to advance.222 
Throughout the report’s descriptions of various methods whereby 
the mortgage finance market can be more privatized, there is no 
mention that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were actually privately 
held companies, financed by private capital from shareholders and 
sales of securities, until 2008 when the GSEs were put into 
conservatorship.223  Rather than reinvent our complicated and 
typically well-functioning tiered mortgage market, perhaps all that is 
needed is restoration of the pre-2005 ownership structure along with 
some vitally important yet less costly reforms.  We do not need to 
eliminate the GSEs to privatize the system—we just need to re-
                                                          
 217. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 13. 
 218. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.  
 219. See infra notes 220-79 and accompanying text. 
 220. See Hassan & Swaminathan, supra note 168, at 8 (noting that the MBA Model 
“[p]oses operational and logistical challenges related to the transfer of know-how 
and infrastructure of the GSEs to new guarantors.”). 
 221. See, e.g., supra note 10. 
 222. See infra Part III. 
 223. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 5. 
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privatize the GSEs, return to sound underwriting, and provide for 
adequate reserves. 
The Obama Administration outlined three possible pathways to 
privatization of the home finance market, all involving a trade off 
among four factors:  access to mortgage credit, investment in the U.S. 
housing sector, taxpayer protection, and financial and economic 
stability.224  For example, the report explains that a completely private 
secondary market, unsupported by any government guaranty, 
insurance, or market support, would provide maximum taxpayer 
protection, but would limit access to credit, investment in the 
housing sector, and likely financial and economic stability.225  Other 
proposals involve shoring up economic and financial stability by 
having the government ultimately backstop a future secondary 
market meltdown, but would still adversely impact mortgage credit 
access and housing sector investment.226  The Report presumes that it 
is virtually impossible to achieve all four of these factors 
simultaneously.227 
Creating “skin in the game” can be achieved by permitting the 
GSEs to survive while gradually weaning them off of the government 
guaranty as capital reserves and private insurance are built up.  
Compensation and private market incentives are far more likely to 
ensure sound underwriting than are government regulators, and at 
lower taxpayer cost.  Unsupported by taxpayer bailout, investors and 
shareholders would demand that the GSEs commit to better 
mortgage underwriting standards for purchased and pooled loans.  
Compensation for all market players reflecting loan quality rather 
than quantity would control against the risk of taxpayer bailout and 
systemic failure.  With the GSEs intact, mortgage lending would 
continue to be assisted by the capital and liquidity support the 
secondary market and mortgage backed securitization provides.  If 
GSE reform occurred within the context of wider market and 
systemic underwriting and risk assessment and allocation 
improvements, this continued access to capital could coexist with 
market stability and attractive investment options, all without 
sacrificing the taxpayers’ interest.   
                                                          
 224. Id. at 24-27. 
 225. Id. at 27-28. 
 226. Id. at 28-30. 
 227. See id. at 31 (explaining that the three proposed options achieve some of the 
four factors at the expense of others); see also Michael Barr, A Framework for Housing 
Finance Reform, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., NAVIGATING UNCERTAIN WATER:  MORTGAGE 
LENDING IN THE WAKE OF THE GREAT RECESSION, Feb. 4, 2011 (less than 1% of GSE 
losses have come from loans originated in 2009 and 2010). 
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The Report itself admits that “[t]he losses that the federal 
government has covered at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac . . . are 
virtually all attributable to bad loans that those firms took on during 
the height of the housing bubble[,]” and goes on to state that with 
new and stricter underwriting, the loans guaranteed by the GSE today 
are “of much higher quality” and “unlikely to pose a significant risk of 
loss to taxpayers.” 228  This itself highlights how the system itself is not 
irreparably broken; rather, there was a lapse in underwriting that 
caused enormous loss.  Admittedly, there is still ample “bathwater” to 
be drained from the system—by ensuring poor underwriting is no 
longer appealing or even tolerable to investors or shareholders.  But 
why throw out the “baby” of a secondary market system that not only 
works, but is involved in the majority of mortgages originated today?  
Yes, the market imploded and the GSEs are ailing.  But they should 
be healed, not eliminated.  The GSE-created housing finance system 
worked well for more than forty years, providing “efficient, cost 
effective lending and benefits to our economy . . . .”229  Much of that 
system can be salvaged. 
C. The Ugly:  Unintended Consequences of Eliminating the GSEs 
While there may be political reasons for casting blame on the GSEs 
for their costly, taxpayer-funded bailout, eliminating Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac altogether is only justified if it goes beyond a punitive 
impulse and prospectively would create a better market reality.  
Winding down the GSEs may solve the challenges posed by their 
erstwhile government implicit backup and market share, but without 
a better option it could create more problems than it would solve.  In 
addition, focusing on certain issues that would go away with the 
demise of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ignores the reality that many 
risks this move aims to avoid would only be relocated.230  
                                                          
 228. Id. at 23. 
 229. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) claims 
that we need to “fix the parts of the housing finance system which need attention 
without dismantling the aspects of the system that have provided efficient, cost 
effective lending and benefits to our economy for the last 30 years.”  Press Release, 
SIFMA Statement on Administration’s Housing Finance Reform White Paper (Feb. 
11, 2011), available at http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=23305. 
 230. This is one of the themes explained in Gerald Hanweck, Anthony Sanders & 
Robert Van Order, Securitization versus Traditional Banks:  An Agnostic View of the Future 
of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Banks, FINREG 21 (Sept. 28, 2009), 
http://www.finreg21.com/ lombard-street/securitization-versus-traditional-banks-an-
agnostic-view-future-fannie-mae-freddie-mac; Van Order, supra note 20, at 233-55; 
Robert Van Order, The Economics of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 23 REGULATION 27, 
27-33 (2000).  Van Order bases his assessment of market health from varying 
institutional types on the classic theory of Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller.  
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Furthermore, getting rid of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could 
potentially cause dire unintended consequences for rental housing, 
communities, as well as the housing finance market in general.  
Reforming the GSEs’ charters might capture the same benefits as 
winding down these institutions—namely, minimizing taxpayer risk—
while avoiding some of the collateral damage that the elimination of 
the GSEs would likely entail.  
1. Market Uncertainty 
There are five categories of unintended consequences that must be 
factored into any accurate cost-benefit analysis of winding down the 
GSEs.  First, the current significant dependence of the market on 
GSE-enhanced capital flow suggests that a too-rapid wind-down of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would increase market uncertainty.  
While the Treasury/HUD Report posits that private capital would 
materialize to fill a market gap left by the departing GSEs,231 there is 
no true indication that this would happen.  Since nine out of every 
ten loans today are either insured by the FHA or funded through 
GSE secondary market purchases,232 reductions in GSE market activity 
would markedly increase uncertainty in the finance capital available 
for single family and multifamily residential mortgages.233   
Unpredictability is costly for borrowers as well as lenders and 
investors, and unpredictability in the financial markets will stymie any 
true recovery from the financial crisis.  Would-be buyers of real 
property—particularly distressed REO or foreclosure properties—
                                                          
Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the 
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 261-297 (1958).   
 231. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 12-13.  Chris Whalen of Institutional 
Risk Analytics calls it “childish” to predict the return of private capital to the 
mortgage finance market “at a time when the only loans being underwritten are for 
those with government guarantees.”  Tom Braithwaite & Suzanne Kapner, White 
House seeks Wind Down of Fannie and Freddie, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011; see also 
Barr, supra note 227. 
 232. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 12; Secondary Market Report, supra 
note 164; see also Rick Newman, Kill Fannie & Freddie? Not Likely!, US NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Feb. 21, 2011; Marc Santora, New Worries for Buyers Seeking Mortgages, THE N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011. 
 233. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 23-24 (emphasizing that a winding 
down of the GSEs must happen gradually in order to be a “responsible transition.”).  
Several commentators have reiterated the need for a cautionary pace because of the 
grave threat to the market that imminent credit shut-down would pose.  See, e.g., 
Ellen et al., supra note 55; Douglas J. Elliott, The Middle Class Still Needs Help, THE N.Y. 
TIMES, March 8, 2011 (arguing that the GSEs should be gradually phased out in “an 
intelligent transition plan”).  Other commentators opine that slowing the wind-down 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not prevent the resulting adverse market effects.  
See, e.g., Press Release, Consumer Federation of America, Administration Proposal 
Could Threaten Consumer Access to Safe, Affordable Homeownership (Feb. 11, 
2011) [hereinafter CFA Press Release]. 
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cannot and will not proceed in the absence of clearly defined capital 
availability and costs.  The GSE TBA market234 allowed borrowers to 
lock in lending rates before a property conveyance, but that might 
not be true of a market without the gears of mortgage lending 
greased by a ready-made secondary buyer.  Lenders will be wary of 
originating loans without a ready secondary market purchaser, and 
investors may be unable to assess credit risks of private label 
securities.  The uncertainty of today’s market has caused private 
capital to flee, and it is not at all certain that private capital will be 
enticed back into mortgage lending merely by the gradual wind-down 
of the GSEs.  The U.S. News & World Report accurately assesses that 
“[w]ithout the government, in other words, hardly anybody would be 
able to buy a home today,” and if mortgage financing is less available, 
the housing market could suffer still further declines that may 
“trigger another recession.”235  Furthermore, additional lending costs 
could price “[e]ven some middle-class families with good credit” out 
of homeownership, “leaving politicians to explain how they killed the 
American Dream.”236 
Capital availability is essential to recovery from the current 
mountain of bad mortgage debt.237  Without capital, would-be 
foreclosure buyers will be unable to take title to distressed properties, 
prolonging the current foreclosure limbo.  Real estate prices and 
valuation will continue to decline until foreclosure rates return to 
their former levels.238  In the meantime, homeowners—particularly 
those with negative equity—lack any financial incentive to make 
payments on their debt (assuming the debt cannot be brought 
current or paid off) and further lack the motivation to maintain their 
                                                          
 234. The “TBA” market refers to the GSEs’ ability to pre-sell loans (prior to 
origination) and therefore guaranty capital prior to loan origination.  This pre-
selling of loans to funding sources allowed originators to “lock in” mortgage rates, 
since their capital costs were known.  The TBA market is essential to liquidity, says 
SIFMA.  See SIFMA Statement on Administration’s Housing Finance Reform White 
Paper, supra note 229.   
 235. Rick Newman, Kill Fannie and Freddie?  Not Likely, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://money.msn.com/investing/kill-fannie-and-freddie-not-likely-
usnews.aspx.  
 236. Rick Newman, Why Fannie and Freddie May Never Die, USNEWS.COM (Feb. 15, 
2001(, http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/ 2011/02/15/why-
fannie-and-freddie-may-never-die; see supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 237. The Mortgage Bankers Association reported in November 2010 that 
approximately 14% of all mortgages, meaning nearly 4 million properties, are 
delinquent or in foreclosure.  See Lawler:  How Many Folks Have “Lost Their Homes” to 
Foreclosure/Short Sales/DILs?, CALCULATED RISK (Feb. 2, 2011, 5:30 PM) 
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2011/02/lawler-how-many-folks-have-lost-
their.html; see also Calculated Risk Data, supra note 206. 
 238. Boyack, supra note 68, at 70. 
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homes.239  Foreclosure limbo for negative equity properties is the 
worst possible reality, leading to deterioration of the housing stock, 
cost-shifting onto blameless neighboring owners, and increasing 
market uncertainty and investor flight.240  Tightening the flow of 
capital exacerbates the huge costs that foreclosure delay imposes on 
communities, mortgage lenders and investors,241 particularly until the 
inventory of bad loans is cleared out of the system. 
Still, proponents of GSE wind-down maintain that private capital 
will move in to fill any vacuum left by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.242  
This faith in a seamless market solution to the capital liquidity 
problem seems ill-founded, particularly in light of private capital’s 
behavior over the past few years.  All we have seen since 2008 is 
widespread flight of private capital from the housing finance 
business.243  It will take more than a theoretical market opportunity to 
bring private capital back, particularly for securities that carry credit 
risk.  Even the Treasury/HUD Report admits that “[i]n the wake of 
the financial crisis, private capital has not sufficiently returned to the 
mortgage market,” although the Report echoes this hope that private 
capital may reappear in the wake of a GSE wind-down.244 
Even if private capital were to return to a stable mortgage finance 
market, recent experience has validated one fear that justified 
creation of the GSEs to begin with:  private capital will not continue 
to exist during market downturns.  Just when the flow of credit is 
most needed to keep a market from freezing up or panicking, most 
private capital sources dry up.  While the Treasury/HUD Report 
recognizes this and suggests some system of emergency-only public 
                                                          
 239. Boyack, supra note 215.   
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 12-13. 
 243. See supra note 235.  Rescuing Fannie and Freddie was necessary to keep the 
residential mortgage market machinery from grinding to a halt and mitigated the 
impact of the crash on homeowners and homebuyers.  See Testimony of Herbert 
Allison, supra note 73; Stuart Gabriel & Stuart Rosenthal, Do the GSEs Expand the 
Supply of Mortgage Credit?  New Evidence of Crowd Out in the Secondary Mortgage Market, J. 
OF PUBLIC ECONS. (forthcoming). Commentators from all sides of the political 
spectrum reluctantly admit that 2008-2011 would be credit frozen years for housing 
had Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac not been taken over and compelled to keep capital 
flowing into housing finance.  Barr, supra note 227. Barry Zigas of the CFA recently 
said that “the conservatorship has been a tremendous help in stabilizing the decline 
in the housing market, and has been one of the key reasons that the housing market 
has not crashed further.”  Politics:  Shattered Dreams:  The End of Fannie and Freddie, 
FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 21, 2011), 
http://www.politics.foxnews.mobi/quickPage.html?page=23888&content=48532108
&pageNm=-1. 
 244. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 12. 
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capital to stabilize markets in times of need,245 it is unclear how this 
sort of capital support system could be turned on and off like a 
faucet. 
2. Higher Costs of Mortgage Capital 
The cost of capital will increase as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
leave the market.246  Proponents and critics of the GSE system alike 
agree that capital costs are lower today because of the GSEs.  While 
economists have modeled and estimated the degree to which 
mortgage capital costs will grow should Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
cease to play their market role, some increase in the cost of lending 
and borrowing is virtually certain.  Raising the cost of housing finance 
capital will create other outcomes in sequence, and each of these 
spells adverse consequences for the economy.  First, higher costs of 
borrowing will decrease access to mortgage finance, which will 
decrease access to homeownership and put downward pressure on 
real estate values.  As the cost of capital increases, more and more 
would-be borrowers will be priced out of the market.  This is 
particularly true if underwriting standards and loan-to-value ratio 
requirements increase—as they must.247  While increased 
underwriting standards alone will disqualify some would-be 
borrowers, raising the cost of capital in addition will make 
homeownership unavailable to millions of Americans.  In the past 
three years, homeownership levels have eroded to the pre-2000 range 
(while demographic changes in population suggest that in a neutral 
                                                          
 245. Id. at 28-29. 
 246. This is a nearly unanimous opinion of commentators on the issue.  John 
McIlwain, Homeownership:  Deferring the Dream, URBAN LAND INST., Feb. 23, 2011 (“all 
proposals . . . will create a more costly mortgage market for consumers”).  The only 
contested issue in is by how much the cost of capital will in fact increase.  See, e.g., 
Credit Suisse Report, supra note 168; Adam Quinones, Risk Retention Reform is Top 
Priority:  White Paper Winners and Losers, MORT. NEWS DAILY (Feb. 11, 2011), 
www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/channels/198694/print.aspx (predicting a 2 
percentage point cost increase for 30-year fixed rate loans if the GSEs are wound 
down); Treasury Plan Admits to an Increase in the Cost of Housing, NAT’L MORT. NEWS, 
Feb. 9, 2011; Michelle Singletary, In Overhauling Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, it’s better 
to be Late than Sorry, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2011; Edward Glaeser, Reform Isn’t 
Enough, THE N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011 (arguing that the increase in capital costs and 
decrease in home values would be “moderate rather than cataclysmic” and that 
“prices would probably drop by less than 2 percent.”).  Mark Zandi, economist and 
adviser to both political parties, estimated that mortgage rates would go up one 
percentage point and home prices would fall by 10% should the GSEs be eliminated. 
Zachary Goldfarb, Bipartisan Support for Scrapping Fannie, Freddie Draws Criticism, THE 
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2011; see also Goldfarb & ElBoghdady, supra note 10. 
 247. See supra Part II.A.; infra Part III.B. 
BOYACK.OFFTOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/17/2011  8:33 PM 
1544 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1489 
market, homeownership would be increasing during this period).248  
Decreased mortgage access will exacerbate that trend. 
Barry Zigas, director of housing policy for Consumer Federation of 
America, claims that the Treasury/HUD Report’s proposals would 
lead to “the abandonment of a nearly 70-year commitment to 
affordable homeownership by working American families.”249  Zigas 
claims that the only beneficiaries would be “Wall Street banks and 
hedge funds” and that the elimination of the GSEs will end up 
“[m]aking consumers pay more in these troubled times.”250  The 
National Council of La Raza and NAACP released a joint statement 
decrying the Administration’s proposal to eliminate the GSEs, saying 
that even in the best case, such proposals will “entirely fail” to meet 
the goal of ensuring access to credit and “will instead marginalize 
communities of color.”251  John Taylor, President and CEO of the 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition predicts that 
elimination of GSE-purchased loans will cause a “radical reduction in 
the number of working class and blue-collar people who can own 
homes” and could close “the window of opportunity for home 
ownership . . . for the next generation of homeowners.”252  
Representative Maxine Waters expressed concern that the proposals 
would “radically increase the cost of homeownership, and housing in 
general,” and therefore be to the detriment of her constituents.253 
                                                          
 248. Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ housing/hvs/annual06/ann06t20.html; see also 
Haya El Nasser, Drop in Homeownership Likely to Continue, USA TODAY (Aug. 6, 2009), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-08-05-rental_N.htm.   
 249. Press Release, Consumer Fed. of Am., Administration Proposals Could 
Threaten Consumer Access to Safe, Affordable Homeownership 1 (Feb. 11, 2011), 
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/ 
Zigas-Response-to-Admin-Housing-Plan-PR-2-11-11.pdf. 
 250. Id. at 3.  Zigas correctly points out that the financial crisis was authored and 
directed by Wall Street, not by the GSEs, who were merely among the largest 
individual victims of the culture of speculation and bad underwriting.  Id. at 2.  Zigas 
blames the housing bubble—and ultimate bust—on “regulators [who] turned their 
backs on consumers and allowed Wall Street banks and investors to wreck the world 
economy with expensive, unsafe and predatory loans that were outside the 
government’s guarantee system to begin with,” and concludes that “sticking it to 
consumers only to enhance Wall Street profits is unacceptable.”  Id. at 3. 
 251. Civil Rights Statement on the Administration’s Report on Reforming the U.S. 
Housing Finance Market, Feb. 11, 2011, available at 
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/Media%20Statement%20Housing
%20funding.pdf; see also Edward Scanlon, The Impact of Homeownership on the Life 
Satisfaction of African Americans, WASH. U. CTR FOR SOCIAL DEV.(1999). 
 252. John Schoen, White House wants Fannie, Freddie to Go, MSNBC.COM (Feb. 11, 
2011), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41520586/ns/business- 
eye_on_the_economy/. 
 253. Zachary Goldfarb & Brady Dennis, Administration Proposals to Overhaul Federal 
Housing Role Draw Fire from Left, THE WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2011), 
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Without a robust secondary mortgage market offering to assume 
interest rate and prepayment risk from mortgage loan originators, 
mortgage product offerings will likely change.  Currently, the 
secondary market is an essential tool for lenders to hedge the risks 
inherent in a system that pairs short-term, flexible interest rate capital 
costs for lenders with what is, in the U.S., the conventional mortgage 
loan type:  a long-term, fixed interest rate, prepayable loan.254  Under 
this structure, the borrower not only can pay back a loan over a long 
period of time, but the borrower bears no interest rate risk at all.  If 
interest rates rise over the life of the loan, the borrower is safely fixed 
at a lower, predictable interest rate set at the funding date.  If interest 
rates drop, the borrower can prepay the debt at no penalty and 
refinance at the lower rate.255  The only reason that mortgage 
originators are motivated to offer such a loan product is because the 
interest rate and prepayment risks are immediately passed on to the 
secondary market (which typically passes them on to investors).  
Saying farewell to the GSEs could well mean the demise of the thirty-
year, fixed rate prepayable mortgage loan.256  Some politicians and 
economists note that this may not be a bad result:  no other country 
in the world offers long-term, fixed rate mortgage loans as a general 
rule.257  Indeed, the only reason these offerings are widely available in 
the U.S. is because of the secondary market and securitization.  
Perhaps the borrowing public will adjust to a European-style 
mortgage lending system, and perhaps not. 
Over the past three years, real estate values have fallen 30% in the 
United States.258  Higher costs of mortgage financing and lower 
mortgage capital access will reduce borrowing power, depress 
housing demand, and further depress real estate values.  While initial 
losses in housing values can be chalked up to correcting for bubble-
era pricing, the current drag on property values indicates a more 
                                                          
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/left-blanches-at-administrations-housing-
market-proposals/2011/02/11/ABJecqF_story.html. 
 254. Kling, supra note 11 (“I am skeptical that the 30 year fixed rate mortgage 
without a prepayment penalty would survive without [Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac]”).  But see Jaffe, supra note 9 (“The 30 year fixed rate mortgage will flourish in a 
private market”). 
 255. See generally Michael Schill, The Impact of Capital Markets on Real Estate Law and 
Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 269-279 (1999); MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13 
at 379-83; Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market–A Catalyst for Change in 
Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. LAW J. 991, 1003-1010 (1986); Barr, supra note 227. 
 256. See, e.g., Applebaum, supra note 12; Borak, supra note 12 (noting that the 
conventional 30-year fixed, prepayable loan will likely not exist in the absence of the 
GSEs). 
 257. See, supra notes 11-12. 
 258. Economist Special Report, supra note 12 at 15; see also supra note 3. 
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serious and long-lasting trend and relates to increasing 
unemployment, lower wealth, and higher credit standards.259  These 
factors already constrain housing demand and put downward 
pressure on prices.  If credit costs increase, it will be even more 
difficult to get capital for housing and prices of homes will fall 
further still.  Reducing the availability of mortgage capital also makes 
real estate less liquid, making it harder for people to sell homes, 
more difficult to own or buy a home, and incidentally making the 
population less mobile.  
Falling property values also represent a destruction of wealth for 
Americans, amounting to trillions of dollars.260  The U.S. savings rate 
is one of the lowest in the world.261  The way many people build 
wealth and save for retirement is by building equity in their homes, 
through a combination of amortization and appreciation.262  When 
home values plummet, retirement savings and the American 
homeowner’s “nest egg” disappear.  As we have already seen in the 
wake of the housing meltdown, this destruction of wealth has far-
reaching consequences.  The capital gap to cover disappeared wealth 
has already had far-reaching repercussions in the world’s economy:  
in 2008, some four trillion dollars disappeared from the world’s 
“balance sheet” (as if the GDPs of France, Spain and Italy had all 
vanished).263   
                                                          
 259. See discussion of underlying home valuation fundamentals in Boyack, supra 
note 68 at n.29-44 and accompanying text. 
 260. See In Come the Waves, supra note 65. 
 261. The average savings rate for Americans in the decade prior to January 2000 
was a scant 3.5%, but this rate fell below 1.0% multiple times in the decade between 
2000 and 2010.  Comparison of Personal Saving in the National Income and Product 
Accounts with Personal Saving in the Flow of Funds Accounts, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS 
(March 25, 2011); see also NAHB April Statement, supra note 10. 
 262. See Social Benefits of Homeownership and Stable Housing, RESEARCH DIV., NAT’L 
ASS’N OF REALTORS, 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.realtor.org/research/research/homeownershipbenefits; Eric Belsky & 
Joel Prakken, Housing Wealth Effects:  Housing’s Impact on Wealth Accumulation, Wealth 
Distribution and Consumer Spending 3 (2004), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/w04-13.pdf (explaining equity 
building as method to accumulate wealth); Testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for 
Responsible Lending, Before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on 
Insurance, Housing and Community Opportunity, Are There Government Barriers to the 
Housing Market Recovery?, Feb. 16, 2011 [hereinafter Gordon Testimony]; see also 
Economist Special Report, supra note 12 at 5.  But see William Goetsmann & Matthew 
Spiegel, The Policy Implications of Portfolio Choice in Underserved Mortgage Markets, JOINT 
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. U. (Aug. 2001) (alleging that when adjusting for 
inflation, homeownership does not increase wealth).   
 263. See MAITLAND & BLITZER, supra note 3.  GDP per capita (PPP) as described in 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook, available at 
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2195.html; see 
also Heather Landy & Renae Merle, A Record Fall on Wall Street:  Stocks Dive as Bailout 
Bill Fails to Pass, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2008 (noting that the Dow Jones 
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Falling property values will also spell further reductions in property 
tax revenue for communities.  Again, we have already seen the start of 
this trend as depressed values lead to decreased municipal revenues.  
Municipalities face budgetary gaps caused by lower-than-expected 
property tax inputs, which puts at risk the many public goods 
provided by localities, including schools, libraries, parks, emergency 
services and the like.264  Correcting for this reduction in value by 
increasing millage rates will be politically difficult if not impossible. 
3. Insufficient Rental Housing 
Increased market uncertainty and higher costs of borrowing will 
make home-buying less available, which means that rental demand 
will increase.  While there be many reasons to support an affordable 
market for rental housing as a viable alternative to homeownership,265 
ironically, without Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acting to keep funds 
flowing to multifamily housing development, there will be insufficient 
rental housing to support this increasing demand.  The multifamily 
housing loan portfolios of the GSEs did not create losses for the 
entities, perhaps because multifamily project mortgages continued to 
be well underwritten even in 2006-07.266  Multifamily loans held or 
guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have suffered almost no 
                                                          
industrial average tumbled 7 percent, or 777.68 points, eclipsing the record point 
drop after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, to close at 10,365.45; the technology-
heavy Nasdaq composite index slid 9.14 percent, or 199.61, to 1983.73, and the 
broader Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index lost 8.79 percent, or 106.62, to close at 
1106.39.”); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION:  HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, 29-38, 87-113 (2008) 
(attributing the financial crisis to un-tempered increases in home prices); Ruth 
Mantell, Home Prices Off Record 18% in Past Year, Case-Schiller Says, MARKETWATCH 
(Dec. 30, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/home-prices-off-record-18-in-
past-year-case-shiller-says. 
 264. William Selway, U.S. Property Taxes Fall by Most Since Housing Market Crash, 
BLOOMBERG, Mar. 29. 2011 (citing Census Bureau reports of a $5.3 billion drop in 
municipal real estate tax collections); Gordon Testimony, supra note 262, at 5; G. 
Thomas Kingsley, Robin Smith & David Price, The Impact of Foreclosures on Families and 
Communities, THE URBAN INST. fig. 3 (May 2009). 
 265. 2010 Harvard Housing Study supra note 78; 2008 Harvard Housing Study, 
supra note 78. One third of Americans today rent their residences; see Rental 
Housing Finance, supra note 77. 
 266. One reason that rental properties in general have fared better during the 
housing crisis is that revenue-producing properties are usually subject to a different 
pricing methodology, namely the stream-of-income method.  Valuation based on the 
stream of income was linked to a less-manipulable variable, namely salary levels, and 
these provided some constraint in appraisals.  The bubble did not grow as fast or as 
large in sectors where housing was priced according to the stream-of-income 
method, which meant the fundamentals upon which a loan was assessed and 
underwritten were more reliable and the loan less risky.  See Boyack supra note 68, for 
an in-depth discussion of stream-of-income valuation and other more bubble-prone 
systems. 
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losses (less than a 1% default rate),267 and are still bringing in a profit 
during conservatorship.268  Unwinding the GSEs would change that, 
tightening credit availability not only for single family lending but for 
multifamily residential projects as well.  Decreased credit availability 
to multifamily developers and landlords would be devastating to 
housing availability and costs, particularly as demand for rental 
options continues to rise.  
It is doubtful that private capital would adequately fill a void in this 
sector,269 even though defaults have been minimal.  Had the GSEs not 
continued funding multifamily housing from 2008 to 2010, there 
would have been widespread foreclosures on performing apartment 
property loans as owners of these projects would have been unable to 
obtain capital to refinance at maturity.270  The thousands of rental 
units that were at stake have thus far been saved.  These renters 
would be imperiled in a future without predictable capital for 
multifamily mortgage lending.  
During the next few decades, demand for rental housing is 
projected to increase significantly.  In the next five years, two-thirds 
of all new households will be rentals, which means six million new 
rental households will enter the market, demanding housing 
options.271  Professor Arthur Nelson of the University of Utah predicts 
that half of all homes built between now and 2030 will have to be 
rental units to meet this growing demand.272  Since private capital for 
                                                          
 267. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text. 
 268. Up to $2 billion so far.  NMHC Perspective, supra note 74.   
 269. Traditionally, the majority of multifamily home mortgages have been sold on 
the secondary market to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  NMHC Perspective, supra note 
74; see also Rental Housing Finance, supra note 77 at 2.  The Center for American 
Progress proposes that mortgage-backed securities issues be chartered specifically for 
multifamily housing mortgage lending.  See generally Rental Housing Finance, supra 
note 77. 
 270. NMHC Perspective, supra note 64; see also Policy Brief:  Meeting Multifamily 
Housing Finance Needs During and After the Credit Crisis, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD U. (Jan. 2009) (warning that without loan purchases by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, “apartment transactions could come to a near standstill”). 
 271. Arthur C. Nelson, The New Urbanity:  The Rise of a New America, 626 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCIENCE, 192 (Nov. 2009) (predicting that the upcoming shift 
into rental households will be “as sweeping a change to America’s metropolitan 
landscape as the half century after World War II”); see also Rental Housing Finance, 
supra note 77, at 1 (describing the “echo boom” generation entering the housing 
market during the next decade and predicting that “rents will in all likelihood rise, 
perhaps sharply, over the next 10 years”).  The number of renters becoming home-
owners has dramatically dropped off in the years since the financial crisis.  See 
Economist Special Report, supra note 12, at 5. 
 272. Nelson, supra note 271; see also ARTHUR C. NELSON, DEMOGRAPHIC OUTLOOK 
FOR MULTI-FAMILY HOUSING (2009); Arthur C. Nelson, Catching the Next Wave:  Older 
Adults and the “New Urbanism,” 33 J. OF THE AM. SOC’Y ON AGING 37 (Winter 2009-
2010). 
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new apartment construction has essentially disappeared since the 
crisis began, how will there be sufficient financing to build the 
required 300,000 new rental units a year without Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac?  Outside the GSEs, there is not sufficient capital to even 
replace units lost through demolition and obsolescence.273  The 
growing rental demand projections make this shortfall even more 
acute. 
Collateral damage to the multifamily housing market would be 
ironic as well as unfortunate because providing capital to this market 
has cost taxpayers nothing.  Not only have these loans performed well 
and have earned the GSEs profits, but 90% of the apartments 
financed by the GSEs are affordable to families without government 
assistance.274  In this way, the GSEs do precisely what they had been 
envisioned to do:  allocate private funds to provide housing to those 
who can afford to pay reasonable housing costs while freeing up 
governmental funds to provide subsidies to people who cannot 
(through FHA and VA). 
Constraining the rental housing supply while demand increases 
will of course mean rents will go up.  This will make existing rental 
housing less affordable, particularly for the most vulnerable segments 
of society.  In turn, this will lead to more dependence on government 
housing aid, putting more of a burden on the FHA.  The FHA is 
already overwhelmed with the number of loans it is being asked to 
insure, its own market share having increased from less than 10% to 
almost 40% since the crisis began.275  One of the immediate goals of 
the Treasury/HUD Report is to scale back FHA’s market share,276 but 
                                                          
 273. NMHC Perspective, supra note 74.  The debate on the future of the GSEs has 
largely ignored the impact multifamily housing. Peter Lawrence, Policy Points:  
Multifamily Finance:  The Neglected Issue in the Fannie-Freddie Debate, 11 J. OF TAX CREDITS 
1 (2011) (“[W]hat may get lost in this vigorous and consequential GSE debate is 
ensuring that a well-performing, highly liquid capital market for multifamily rental 
housing continues.”). 
 274. NMHC Perspective, supra note 64.  Today 30 million of the 36.7 million 
rental units in America are not subsidized in any way by the federal government.  
Rental Housing Finance, supra note 77, at 9; 2008 Harvard Housing Study, supra note 
78, at 12.  Even so, the specter of un-affordability of housing hangs over rental 
housing as a whole, since renters spend a disproportionately higher share of their 
income to meet their housing needs. 2010 Harvard Housing Study, supra note 78; see 
also Gordon Testimony, supra note 262, at 6. 
 275. Robert Van Order & Anthony Yezer, FHA Assessment Report:  The Role and 
Reform of the Federal Housing Administration in a Recovering U.S. Housing Market, GEO. 
WASH. CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN ANALYSIS (Feb. 2011) (finding that the FHA 
“moved into uncharted, risky territory” by increasing its market share from 6% to 
more than 56%). 
 276. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 14.  Immediately following the 
release of the Treasury/HUD Report, the FHA raised its mortgage insurance 
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if the need for government housing assistance increases, that will 
prove impossible. 
Efforts to reduce the number of FHA-insured loans have already 
essentially eliminated most FHA financing for condominium 
products, which ironically would normally have provided another 
source of affordable multifamily living.  The first steps taken by the 
FHA to deliberately remove itself from segments of the mortgage 
finance focused on cutting off insurance for condominium unit 
financing.277  Thousands of condominium sales have been chilled or 
frozen because of the lack of available capital due to changes in the 
FHA condominium approval process (changes that include internally 
inconsistent and sometimes incomprehensible requirements) and 
hugely widespread approval expiration without the possibility of spot-
approval renewals.278  Eliminating FHA-insured financing for 
condominiums and multifamily housing developments while winding 
down the GSEs would further undercut efforts to promote such 
vertical living arrangements as viable ownership and rental housing 
options.  
The Treasury/HUD Report admits that Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac “developed expertise in profitably providing financing to the 
middle of the rental market, where housing is generally affordable to 
moderate-income families,”279 but in advocating a wind-down of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Report offers absolutely no 
suggestions regarding possible alternative financing sources for this 
increasingly critical market sector.  Until a reliable substitute for the 
GSEs in this context is found, winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac would be irresponsible policy. 
                                                          
premium by 0.25% in order to build up reserves in its Mutual Mortgage Insurance 
Fund and to deliberately reduce market share.  Wood, supra note 15. 
 277. HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-19, June 12, 2009; HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-
46A, Nov. 6, 2009; HUD Mortgagee Letter 2009-46B, Nov. 6, 2009). 
 278. While GSE support of mortgage financing for single family homes has been 
cited as one of the ways our legal system promotes sprawl (along with the biggest 
sprawl factor—zoning), the creation of the condominium ownership form in the 
1960s permitted the twin goals of homeownership and re-urbanization/re-greening 
of housing to co-exist.  It is surprising that the first housing product sector to suffer 
from government pullout is the very product sector that is most affordable, most 
likely to give rental housing alternatives, and typically most “green.”  It is even more 
surprising that most scholars condemning homeownership promotion as “push[ing] 
Americans away from urban density toward suburbia, leading to longer commutes, 
more energy use and the decline of urban centers,” ignore the condominium 
homeownership model.  See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 246. 
 279. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 20.  
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4. Diversion of Investment Capital 
The Treasury/HUD Report recognizes that the GSEs aided in 
attracting capital to U.S. mortgage capital markets.280  Eliminating the 
GSEs will, in turn, likely divert capital away from the U.S. mortgage 
market.  While the Administration notes that this diverted capital 
could be put to use in other productive segments of the U.S. 
economy, this optimistic assumption understates the magnitude of 
real estate and housing-related sectors in the economy today and 
ignores the fact that much investment capital in the U.S. housing 
market may be diverted away from the United States altogether. 
American real estate capital markets currently attract money from 
investors worldwide,281 which helps decrease mortgage costs for 
American homebuyers and stimulates employment in the finance, 
housing and construction sectors.  The U.S. mortgage market is “one 
of the largest and most liquid of all fixed-income markets globally.”282  
This well-functioning, liquid market option attracts “vast amounts of 
private capital.”283  If this market were to be disrupted, investment 
capital would find other homes.  It is impossible to predict precisely 
where, but since capital in the real estate markets originates from all 
parts of the globe, it is likely that at least some of this capital will be 
diverted to other countries.  
Less capital in the U.S. housing market will further increase 
unemployment.  To date, the biggest job losses have been in 
construction, development and other fields related to the wrecked 
housing market as well as the $11 trillion housing finance system.284  
But other sectors have been—and will be—adversely impacted as 
well.  Fewer home sales reduce employment in home furnishings, 
appliances, sales, home improvement, and a host of other related 
                                                          
 280. Id. at 4, 25. 
 281. Thompson, supra note 11, at 52.  (“As mortgage backed securities performed 
outstandingly and generated profits, Wall Street, and almost every other 
international player, became euphoric about these new debt instruments.  Believing 
them to be reliable and safe investments, an array of world renowned financial 
institutions flocked to invest.”); see also Anatomy of a Meltdown, The Credit Crisis:  A 
Three-Part Series on the U.S. Housing Bust, THE WASH. POST, June 15-17, 2008 (chart 
showing global investments 200-2008).  “Wall Street had no shortage of customers for 
subprime products, including pension funds and investors in places such as Asia and 
the Middle East, where wealth had blossomed over the past decade.” Id. at pt. 1. 
 282. See SIFMA Statement on Administration’s Housing Finance Reform White 
Paper, supra note 229.  
 283. Id. 
 284. The construction industry alone has suffered the loss of 1.9 million jobs since 
2007, with the unemployment rate in that industry at more than 20%. Employment 
Situation Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Apr. 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm; see also Barr, supra note 227. 
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areas of the economy—and rising unemployment is currently the 
largest barrier to ultimate economic recovery. 
5. Competition and Market Failures 
One other ugly unintended consequence of winding down Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac is the reduction in market competition and 
accountability for mortgage originators that would result from the 
huge competitive advantage that would be enjoyed by the largest 
banking institutions in the absence of GSE underwriting and capital 
support to level the playing field.  Four companies would be the 
biggest beneficiaries of winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:  
Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase and Citibank.285  
These “Big Four” would be the only institutions who would likely be 
able to take over the GSEs’ market share and do what Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac do now.  And without the GSEs, the smaller banks—
the regional and mid-size community banks—would not be able to 
effectively compete.  Eliminating the GSEs would likely spell the end 
of mortgage lending competition outside of this four-bank oligarchy, 
which would significantly reduce the consumer protections inherent 
in a competitive market.286   
While the Treasury/HUD Report suggests that eliminating the 
GSEs would remove entities that have a market advantage and 
                                                          
 285. Some large national banks and major regional banks may benefit to some 
extent as well, but these four mega-banks would reap the largest gains.  This is 
presumably what Barry Zigas of Consumer Federation of America meant when he 
referred to “Wall Street.”  See supra notes 249–251 and accompanying text; see also 
Sara Rosen Wartell & Barry Zigas, High Stakes in Housing Finance Reform, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 11, 2010. 
 286. Currently, community banks have an alliance with Freddie Mac which 
ensures their access to the secondary mortgage market.  Through this program, GSE 
expertise and support allows these smaller banks to compete in the mortgage 
lending market.  News Release, PRNewswire, ICBA and Freddie Mac Renew and 
Enhance Alliance Agreement (Mar. 18, 2011).  Refocusing secondary market share 
to large institutional lenders would not eliminate the problems for which Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac are now accused of foisting on the nation:  moral hazard, bad 
underwriting and mortgage bubble psychology.  In fact, while the GSEs crafted the 
secondary market and securitization for prime loans, the bulk of the risk, loss, and 
systemic peril was created at the hands of the securitizing investment banks.  
Ironically, to the extent that destroying Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac benefits 
banking giants, the “solution” to the mortgage crisis would actually sacrifice stable 
loans and reward the very authors of systemic risk.  Moral hazard and underwriting 
problems were by far more imperiling in the private sector.  See Gary B. Gorton, 
Slapped in the Face by the Invisible Hand:  Banking and the Panic of 2007 39-40 
(May 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s 
2009 Fin. Mkts. Conference), available at http://www.frbatlant 
 a.org/news/Conferen/09fmc/gorton.pdf.; Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime Panic (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14398, 2008), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14398. 
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thereby create an even playing field,287 this is not the case.  
Community and regional banks lack the capacity to create large 
enough loan pools to obtain sufficient capital to compete with the 
“Big Four.”  In a system where the GSEs set underwriting standards 
for secondary market “conforming loan” purchases, all originators 
are required to play by the same underwriting rules.  But since 
community banks are more vulnerable to individual loan failures 
because of their smaller size, bigger banks can leverage their volume 
in order to decrease underwriting standards and broaden customer 
base in order to push smaller players out of the mortgage lending 
market.  After the dust settled from the 2008 financial meltdown and 
the associated acquisitions, mergers and failures, the Big Four banks 
were left collectively holding an astounding 57% share of the 
residential mortgage market.288  Eliminating the GSEs would increase 
their market dominance and ensure that they remain, in effect, too 
big to fail. 
Rendering smaller banks less able to compete in the mortgage 
market will hasten their irrelevance as mortgage originators.  What 
does that mean for the residential housing finance market? Instead of 
a myriad of various-sized originating lenders, we would be left with 
four giant lenders and a small number of larger regional banks.  The 
best case is that only the four giant lenders would effectively be too 
big to fail.  In addition, unlike in the case of the GSEs that had a 
special charter-based mandate and oversight, there is no government 
input or control over these banking institutions other than through 
legislation.  
Giving further market advantage to the Big Four banks is especially 
ironic because it was the private sector MBS that spawned and 
triggered the housing meltdown to begin with.289  While perpetrators 
and victims of the crises of 2007-08 abound, the fact that private label 
securitization losses were more than double those of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, and the fact that underwriting was more absent and 
                                                          
 287. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 8, 12-13.  In fact, removing the GSEs 
could create an uneven playing field benefitting the big banks.  See supra notes 274-
277 and accompanying text.  But see Mayer supra note 11 (arguing that smaller banks 
could organize into cooperatives to effectively compete with larger institutions and 
pointing out that this is what has happened in Denmark). 
 288. Wells Fargo originated 23.92% of residential loans in the 4th quarter of 2009, 
Bank of America originated 22.43%, Chase originated 9.02% and CitiMortgage 
originated 2.81%.  Only five other lenders were above 2% market share, and no 
other lender was above 5%.  Top Residential Originators 4Q09, NAT’L MORTG. NEWS 
(March 8, 2010), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/nmn_issues/34_23/-
456249-1.html; see also Gordon Testimony, supra note 262, at 18. 
 289. See supra notes 88, 105, 286. 
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risk-management more out of control in the private sector, all argue 
against handing the Big Four the “keys to the kingdom” by 
eliminating their only true competitors:  Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.  The Consumer Federation of America notes that taking the 
GSEs out of the equation would shift control of mortgage banking to 
“Wall Street banks and investors whose previous missteps have already 
caused massive foreclosures and losses for consumers.”290  As Rick 
Newman of U.S. News & World Report notes, “[t]hey kind of have a 
point.”291 
III. PATH TO PRESERVE FANNIE AND FREDDIE 
A. Looking Forward 
Eliminating the GSEs may be a good move politically and, 
ironically, is a goal that both Democrats and Republicans agree upon, 
though for different reasons.  Politicians on the right have long been 
concerned with taxpayer support of housing in the form of the 
implicit guaranty of the secondary mortgage market, and argue that 
the presence of the GSEs sets up quasi-public entities as favored 
market players, costing taxpayers billions.292  The failure of the GSEs, 
say those on the right, was their failure to remain truly private 
corporations and their attempt to advance housing goals, not just 
shareholder profit.  Politicians on the left cite the opposite reason as 
the cause of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s failure:  by bowing to 
profit-maximizing pressures of shareholders and management, the 
GSEs strayed from their public purpose and mandate to increase 
housing opportunities for lower-income Americans.293  As Professor 
Robert Van Order of The George Washington University School of 
Business put it, “Republicans want to get rid of [Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac], and Democrats want them to become the FHA.”294  
                                                          
 290. Newman, supra note 236 (quoting Barry Zigas); see also Barr, supra note 227. 
 291. Newman supra note 232; see also Adam J. Levitin, More Openness on Mortgages, 
THE N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2011 (opining that “privatizing the housing finance system 
means increased financial vulnerability for homeowners and greater systemic risk 
from the housing sector” and pointing out that “the private securitization market has 
never provided transparency of credit risk to investors and will not do so on its 
own.”). 
 292. See supra notes 7, 9, 60 and 128-133 and accompanying text; see also Goldfarb, 
supra note 246 (“Republicans want to accelerate the mortgage giants’ demise, 
reflecting their view that Fannie and Freddie are government-created monstrosities 
whose victims have been the taxpayers.”). 
 293. Goldfarb, supra note 246 (“Although Republicans and the administration 
agree that Fannie and Freddie have to go, that’s where the agreement ends.”). 
 294. Conversation with Professor Robert Van Order, Professor of Fin., Geo. Wash. 
U. (Mar. 10, 2011); see also White, supra note 197. 
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Interestingly, each side is both right and wrong.  Profit-maximizing 
activities did lead to a significant portion of risk-taking behavior in 
2006-2008, in the form of buying and guarantying Alt-A loans in 
particular.295  And Congressional pressure to make mortgage capital 
more available in the hope of further raising homeownership rates 
was what made the GSEs even more vulnerable to market 
downturns.296  The mission-focus of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
combined with their profit seeking led them to buy AAA-rated 
tranches of subprime MBS offerings, which was the most cost 
effective way to meet affordable housing goals set by HUD.297  
Regardless of the failings of the GSEs on both accounts, we need to 
look ahead to the best market and consumer result, not become 
reactionary in our legislation and legal systems, and elimination of 
the GSEs may harm both homeownership and a free market.  
Winding down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may be politically savvy 
in the short term by effecting a large superficial “solution” to the risk 
of yet another taxpayer bailout and may be appealing in allowing the 
government to assign blame and channel public discontent.  But this 
political maneuver risks harming the home finance system in the 
long term to appease short-term calls for response and retribution. 
In the 1980s, the mortgage market was transformed by the growth 
of the secondary market and securitization.  That genie cannot be 
put back in the bottle.  Therefore, our capital markets will still need 
entities that do what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do in order to 
continue to function—generate liquidity by providing a secondary 
market for mortgages.  Keeping the GSEs alive avoids having to 
reinvent the wheel.  These two companies have extensive personnel, 
technology and market expertise.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have 
established banking relationships with lenders, services, appraisers, 
engineers, and other service providers in the mortgage system.  They 
are up and running today, taking advantage of their decades of 
experience in fulfilling the important intermediary function in the 
real estate capital market.   
There are currently no good alternatives.  The Treasury/HUD 
Report fails to even begin to describe adequate market substitutes, 
                                                          
 295. Annual Report (Form 10-K), FANNIE MAE 25 (2007), available at 
http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/annualreport/2007/2007_annual_ report.pdf; 
Annual Report (Form 10-K), FREDDIE MAC 42 (2005), available at 
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/ar/pdf/2005 annualrpt.pdf. 
 296. James Lockhart, Dir., Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Address at the National Press 
Club:  FHFA’s First Anniversary and Challenges Ahead (July 30, 2009), available at 
www.fhfa.gov/web files/14715/FHFA1stAnnSpeechandPPT73009.pdf. 
 297. Id. at 6; Annual Report (Form 10-K), FANNIE MAE (2007). 
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other than vaguely asserting that “private capital” will fill the void left 
by the GSEs,298 or that some public utility sort of entity would step into 
the mission-based role of the GSEs.299It makes little sense to try to 
replace a system that actually works with something we cannot even 
describe except in aspirational terms.  And while the system became 
dysfunctional for a few years, many of the systemic fundamentals, 
including the concept of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and their role, 
successfully bought and sold mortgages and securities for decades 
before.300  Furthermore, the system never stopped working for 
multifamily housing loans, which continue to create company profits 
today.301  Finally, the single-family mortgages being bought today are 
sufficiently underwritten so as to present very little risk of default and 
are projected to be revenue positive for the GSEs.302 
The Administration must look forward, not backward, in order to 
solve the mortgage market problems of today.  The elimination of the 
GSEs, whatever its political appeal, would freeze up mortgage lending 
and wring still more value out of the economy’s housing sector.303  
The enumerated goals of the Administration can be achieved without 
these costs.  Market reform must focus forward, taking into account 
which changes will create benefits while avoiding unintended 
consequences.  Political scapegoating and retributive systemic 
changes will likely divert us from the best path and the best ultimate 
outcomes. 
B. Incentives, Underwriting and Contingency Plans 
It goes beyond the scope of this short article to make specific, 
detailed recommendations.304  However, certain conceptual changes 
                                                          
 298. See generally Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16. 
 299. Consider, for example, the idea of setting up a housing trust fund to provide 
financing for multifamily projects that has been mentioned by the Obama 
Administration.  Id. at 21.  While this may have some appeal conceptually, Robert 
Diamond estimates that the likelihood of this happening while Republicans have a 
majority in the House of Representatives “is between nil and none.”  Interview with 
Robert E. Diamond, Jr., Chief Exec., Barclays PLC (Mar. 1, 2011). 
 300. See supra notes 20-22,33-42, 62-69 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. 
 302. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 23 (“Over the last two years, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac have implemented stricter underwriting standards and 
increased their pricing.  As a result, the new loans being guaranteed by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac today are of much higher quality than in the past and are unlikely 
to pose a significant risk of loss to taxpayers.”). 
 303. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 304. Many projects focusing on recommended solutions are in progress in the 
government, and at law schools, business schools, political science, and economics 
departments across the country, including the Mercatus Center at George Mason 
University and the Center for Responsible Lending.   
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should be present in any viable reform package.  First, changes to the 
finance system must ensure that all players at every level in the 
market have sufficient “skin in the game” to accurately and 
responsibly assess and price risks.  This means that all brokers, 
originators, secondary market purchasers, and issuers must profit 
based on mortgage loan performance rather than originating or 
securitizing volume.305  The Dodd-Frank Act mandates a 5% credit risk 
retention for originating lenders if the loans originated are not 
qualified residential mortgages.306  To limit irresponsible behavior, 
however, some risk retention is appropriate for all originated loans.  
Primary lenders, after all, are best able to assess and control borrower 
credit risk.  If the compensation structure for primary lenders (and 
brokers) is based on loan quality, then the market will produce more 
quality loans.  It is far better to regulate through such direct financial 
incentives than to rely exclusively on expensive and often ineffective 
oversight.  By incentivizing quality rather than quantity, the concerns 
of loan originators and MBS issuers will align with the concerns of the 
capital providers—the investors (or whoever bears the credit risk).   
Increased underwriting is also a vital part of consumer protection.  
While education and disclosure can assist borrowers in 
understanding their debt obligations and perhaps allow borrowers to 
refrain from assuming debt they are likely unable to repay, recent 
experience in the subprime market also indicates that credit 
underwriting and lending limits may be necessary to keep borrowers 
from losing their homes and damaging their credit by assuming 
unrealistic obligations.  To be fully protected, consumers also must 
be protected from themselves. 
Risk retention that motivates better underwriting will also ensure 
that mortgage capital flows at the right pace and to the right 
borrowers because risk will be evaluated and built into the cost of 
providing funds.  The GSEs must have “skin in the game” as well, and 
the only way to avoid the moral hazard of the previously catastrophic 
implicit government guaranty is to back away from such an implicit 
backup completely:  government support of GSE obligations should 
                                                          
 305. The Dodd-Frank Act and Federal Reserve compensation rules fail to 
accomplish this needed change, since compensation for loan originators and 
mortgage brokers is still volume-based.  Alex Ulam, Fed Rules Beget a (Mostly Volume-
Based Mortgage Commission Model, AMERICAN BANKER, April 1, 2011, available at 
http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_63/loan-officer-compensation-
1035261-1.html?pg=2. 
 306. H.R. 4173, § 941; see also NAHB QRM Response, supra note 198.  
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be explicit and limited.307  The concept, no matter how implemented, 
is the same:  change market incentives so that oversight efforts work 
with, rather than against, financial motivation.  Risk retention will 
also encourage market competition—which aids consumer 
protection as well, for both mortgage borrowers and investors. 
Appropriate regulatory backup should support what realigned 
financial incentives are intended to achieve:  better loan 
underwriting for mortgages.308  For decades, the GSEs set the de facto 
standards for mortgage lending across the country by detailing which 
loans they were willing to purchase on the secondary market.309  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can continue this role, creating a ready-
made market for loans meeting enumerated underwriting criteria, 
and the GSEs must effectively ensure compliance with such standards 
as well, whether that means keeping underwriting in house or having 
better quality control (“spot checking”) of delegated underwriters.  
GSE underwriting standards should emphasize safety and soundness 
of the credit risks undertaken by the companies rather than be left 
open to political outcome-based manipulation by Congress or a 
federal agency. 
GSE underwriting criteria must appropriately cover credit analysis 
as well as loan-to-value ratios and loan size caps.  Recent experience 
teaches that low-leverage, low-credit loans can still cause significant 
loss—for example, the tremendous Alt-A losses that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac suffered.310  The Treasury/HUD Report mentions that 
housing finance reform must occur in conjunction with consistent 
and coordinated standards.311  This is, indeed, critical.  Promulgating 
varying and inconsistent standards for underwriting conformity not 
only creates confusion and uncertainty but also increases compliance 
                                                          
 307. Some advocate a complete elimination of government guarantee of GSE 
obligations.  Others advocate a limited backup of GSE guarantee of securities only.  
Either option is preferable to the prior unlimited and speculative government 
guarantee which motivated market gambling by GSE officials and their shareholders 
alike. 
 308. But regulation alone is not the answer.  Regulation built on appropriate 
allocations of economic incentives work better than regulation alone, because 
regulation is imperfect and less flexible than market reactions.  See discussion of 
Boyack supra note 68, at Part IV.B. 
 309. Originating lenders have long accustomed themselves to conforming 
mortgage underwriting and structuring to the demands of their secondary market 
customers, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were their biggest and most reliable 
customers.  See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 13, at 382; see also Levitin, supra note 291 
(pointing out the valuable role that the GSEs can have in ensuring “that the 
financing products are the ones that reduce, rather than create, risk” and explaining 
that a “complete privatization of housing finance would create systemic risk and 
therefore encourage bailouts, not prevent them”). 
 310. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.  
 311. Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 15. 
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(and therefore lending) costs.  Although historically these entities’ 
standards were fairly uniform, unfortunately, current regulation-
based changes have led to a highly inconsistent status quo.  FHA, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac today seem unable (or unwilling) to 
coordinate their approach to our standards for underwriting, and 
variance with HUD and VA further complicate government lending 
approvals and loan oversight.312  Reexamining underwriting criteria 
with an eye to creating a standardized approach should be step one 
of this administration. 
Finally, reforming underwriting is not enough without a viable 
contingency plan for market players and the market as a whole.313  
Basel III has already reacted to a dearth of capital reserves in the 
banking sector by changing reserve requirements.314  Capital reserve 
requirements for the GSEs should also be increased.  In addition, the 
risk of loss for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could be mitigated 
through a combination of other creative and effective privately-
funded mechanisms.  For example, private insurance coverage could 
reduce the companies’ exposure caused by pulling back the 
unlimited governmental guaranty of GSE obligations.315  Some have 
suggested using convertible bond funding to help reestablish 
independent financing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.316  As the 
GSEs are weaned from an unlimited government guaranty, their cost 
of capital will increase and their market share will be reduced.  As 
their capital costs increase, the GSEs’ current systemic dominance 
will erode an appropriate rate and to an appropriate extent, as 
determined by market pricing rather than based on some politically-
set maximum percentage.  Bringing capital costs into market 
alignment will create market opportunities for other capital providers 
if they can adequately protect their own risks in similar (or less costly) 
ways. 
                                                          
 312. See supra notes 213-216 and accompanying text. 
 313. The fate of the GSEs is tied to the rest of the market, and even perfect reform 
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will not insulate the market from untempered and 
exploited risk of speculation if other finance providers are not subject to rules that 
prohibit risk-taking behavior.  The banking and shadow banking industries must be 
regulated as well, especially since moral hazard risks unavoidably plague the entire 
housing finance market to some extent.  See Treasury/HUD Report, supra note 16, at 
29-30, for a discussion of the market stability role of guarantee or reinsurance. 
 314. [Cite discussion of this] 
 315. See supra notes 181-183  
 316. Such convertible bonds (sometimes called Coco bonds) would initially be 
debt issuances, but would convert to equity should losses in excess of a certain 
amount be realized, allowing the debt to be essentially written off if needed.   
See Robert Van Order, Some Thoughts on What to do with Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac 13 (July 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Limiting (or eliminating) the government guaranty of GSE 
obligations also allows Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to function 
independently, as privately funded institutions, rather than as entities 
susceptible to shifting political focus and short-term vote-seeking 
goals.  Taking a step back from the government financially would 
allow the GSEs to take a step back politically as well.  They can stop 
“rolling the dice” and start focusing on market stability and liquidity 
rather than housing subsidization (a role more properly assigned to 
FHA). 
CONCLUSION 
Promoting homeownership through creating a system of privately 
funded real estate capital markets is a wonderful idea that over 
decades created the best housing finance system in the world.317  A 
combination of confused mandates, moral hazard and irresponsible 
underwriting caused the system to break, costing American taxpayers 
over $130 billion.318  The system is indeed broken—but not beyond 
repair.  Denmark, Canada and other countries have interesting 
financial systems, but none of them have provided their populations 
the liquidity that a well-functioning securitized secondary mortgage 
market has in the United States.  Rather than reinvent our system 
from the ground up, the United States needs to preserve what is 
valuable while we fix what went wrong.  
Keeping Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac alive can help achieve a 
positive outcome.  After all, the same goals we had in the Great 
Depression remain good policy objectives today:  increasing housing 
quality, stabilizing capital markets, and allowing for wealth building 
and realization of the “American dream” through homeownership 
and quality rental housing options.  Ensuring stable housing 
alternatives, including homeownership for credit-worthy borrowers, 
remains a politically and socially attractive goal.  Sufficient quality 
and quantity of rental housing is a critical need that should be 
supported by ensuring that lending funds continue to flow to 
multifamily development.  And homeownership is, after all, a way of 
increasing the “skin in the game” of citizens themselves.  
Homeowners are more invested in their communities, take good care 
of their properties, are good citizens, build wealth, pay real estate 
taxes, and create spheres of autonomy.  This is the achievement of an 
American Dream—for individuals and for the country as a whole.   
                                                          
 317. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
